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Abstract
In a vertical chain in which two rivals invest before contracting with one of two
competing suppliers, partial vertical integration may create hold-up problems for the
rival. We develop an experiment to test this theoretical prediction in two setups, in
which suppliers can either pre-commit ex ante to appropriating part of the joint profit,
or degrade ex post the support they provide to their customer. Our experimental re-
sults confirm that vertical integration creates hold-up problems in both setups. How-
ever, we observe more departures from theory in the second one. Bounded rationality
and social preferences provide a rationale for these departures.
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1 Introduction
The risk of expropriation of investment benefits, known as the hold-up problem, has long
been recognized as an important source of inefficient under-investment (see Williamson
(1975, 1985) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978)). In response, the incomplete con-
tract literature has emphasized the role of vertical integration as a solution to this problem
(see Grossman and Hart (1986)). In a recent paper, however, Allain, Chambolle and Rey
(2016) – henceforth ACR – point out that vertical integration can also create hold-up con-
cerns ... for rivals. The aim of this paper is to test this prediction.
Due to a lack of field data, empirical investigations of the hold-up problem rely mostly
on laboratory experiments. These have focused so far on bilateral settings, in which one
player invests and must then share the return with the other player.1 To test the predic-
tions of ACR, we build on this experimental literature and consider an extended setting
in which each player faces competition.
The earlier literature on vertical integration and foreclosure identifies two mechanisms
through which vertical integration could harm independent rivals: supplier opportunism
(Hart and Tirole (1990)) and raising rivals’ costs (Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) and
Salinger (1988)), both of which have been experimentally tested. The first one, which
relies on secret contracting, has been experimentally validated by Martin, Normann and
Snyder (2001). The second one relies in theory on a commitment to stop supplying or
limit rivals’ access. Yet, Normann (2011) finds that vertical integration raises a rival’s cost
even without such commitment; he moreover shows that this is in line with a quantal
response equilibrium, in which players do not best-respond with probability one, but
1For example, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) analyze the impact of communication on hold-up; Sloof,
Oosterbeek and Sonnemans (2007) study instead the role of investment observability, whereas Hoppe and
Schmitz (2011) focus on the effect of contract renegotiation, and Dufwenberg, Smith and Van Essen (2013)
consider the role of rights of control and vengeance.
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choose better responses more frequently. We contribute to this literature by testing a
different mechanism through which vertical integration can harm independent rivals,
namely, the hold-up problem highlighted by ACR.
Before describing our experiment, it is useful to briefly present the setup and predic-
tions of ACR. In the baseline model, two downstream competitors must decide whether
to invest, and then contract with one of two upstream suppliers for support. Together
with support, the investment generates a return, which is reduced if the rival also in-
vests. Two market structures are considered: under vertical separation, the four firms
are independent; under (partial) vertical integration, one upstream and one downstream
firm are merged, whereas the other two firms remain independent. This baseline model
predicts that vertical integration has no impact: upstream competition always leads sup-
pliers – integrated or not – to offer support at cost and, anticipating this, downstream
competitors always invest.
Two variants are then considered. The first one allows suppliers to pre-commit them-
selves ex ante, before investment decisions, to being “greedy”, that is, to asking a large
share of their customers’ profits. Independent suppliers never do so, as this would im-
pede their ability to compete for customers. By contrast, when integrated, exerting this
option enables the supplier to expose its downstream rival to being held up by the inde-
pendent supplier; this discourages the rival from investing, to the benefit of the down-
stream subsidiary.
The second variant allows the supplier, if selected by a downstream firm, to degrade
ex post, at some cost, the quality of its support. An independent supplier has no incentive
to incur this cost and thus never degrades its support. By contrast, when integrated,
the supplier would always degrade the support supplied to its rival, so as to confer an
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advantage to its downstream subsidiary. This exposes again the downstream rival to
being held up by the independent supplier and discourages its investment.
Reflecting these key features, our experiment includes three treatments, each played
first under separation and then under integration. The Benchmark treatment corresponds
to a simplified version of the baseline model in which the potentially integrated down-
stream firm is automatized. There are thus three players: an independent downstream
firm, an independent supplier and a “strategic” supplier, who is either independent or
integrated with the automatized firm; the downstream firm first decides whether to in-
vest, the two suppliers then offer a profit-sharing contract, and finally the firm selects a
supplier. The other two treatments provide the strategic supplier with “hold-up” options.
The Commitment treatment allows it to pre-select the most greedy offer at the beginning
of the treatment, whereas the Sabotage treatment allows it, if selected by the downstream
firm, to degrade ex post its support (which harms the downstream firm but benefits its
automatized rival). Compared with Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001), who consider
an upstream monopoly, and Normann (2011), who focus on upstream players, our exper-
iment involves an interaction between upstream and downstream players, and moreover
allows the former ones, besides deciding over contract terms, to exert hold-up options.
In line with theoretical predictions, our experimental results show that vertical in-
tegration does not create hold-up problems in the Benchmark treatment, where most
downstream players invest, but does so in the Commitment and Sabotage treatments,
where downstream players invest less often in the vertical integration phase. Interest-
ingly, average investment rates suggest that the hold-up problem has a larger impact in
the Commitment than in the Sabotage treatment, but a probit regression does not estab-
lish any significant difference in the marginal effect of vertical integration between these
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two treatments. This leads us to have a closer look at the impact of vertical integration on
individual departures from theory by the three players. We find that in the Commitment
treatment, vertical integration increases the likelihood of departures from theory by the
strategic supplier’s hold-up decision. By contrast, in the Sabotage treatment vertical in-
tegration increases departures from theory of the independent firms: the supplier is too
generous and the downstream firm invests too frequently.
Finally, we exploit the difference in the timing of decisions, between the Commitment
and Sabotage treatments, to relate the departures from theory observed in our experiment
to behavioral approaches emphasized by the experimental literature: bounded rationality
and social preferences.
Bounded rationality (namely, level-k theory)2 can explain the departures from theory
in hold-up decisions. In the Commitment treatment, this decision comes first, and thus re-
quires the strategic supplier to anticipate the other subjects’ subsequent decisions, which
involves higher levels of thinking. By contrast, in the Sabotage treatment this decision
comes last, and thus requires no such anticipation.
The possibility of social preferences for the strategic supplier, and the associated un-
certainty about its behavior,3 can instead explain the departures from theory by the in-
dependent firms. In the Commitment treatment, this uncertainty is resolved at the very
beginning of the treatment. By contrast, in the Sabotage treatment, the other players must
make their decisions before the resolution of this uncertainty. Interestingly, in the vertical
integration phase of the Sabotage treatment we also observe a positive correlation be-
tween the departures from theory by the two independent firms, which is in line with
2See Stahl (1993), Stahl and Wilson (1994), Nagel (1995) and Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004).
3For previous experiments on strategic uncertainty, see, e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) and
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). Fischbacher and Gaechter (2010) find that heterogeneous social prefer-
ences can also create strategic uncertainty, through players’ beliefs about other players’ decisions, in public
good games with simultaneous moves.
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the social preferences interpretation: a departure in the downstream firm’s investment
decision signals this firm’s belief that the strategic supplier has social preferences, which
in turn induces the independent supplier to be more generous.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the theory in Section 2, before describ-
ing the experimental design and the associated predictions in Section 3. We report and
analyze the results in Section 4, and offer some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The model
We first present our baseline setup and briefly characterize the equilibrium outcome. We
then consider the commitment and sabotage variants.
2.1 Benchmark game
2.1.1 Setup
A key assumption underlying the hold-up problem is that firms cannot contract ex ante,
before investment decisions are made. Reflecting this, in ACR two downstream competi-
tors, D1 and D2, choose whether to invest before obtaining support from one of two up-
stream suppliers, UA and UB. Two market structures are considered: Vertical Separation,
in which the four firms are independent, and (partial) Vertical Integration, in which UA
and D1 are merged, while UB and D2 remain independent. In order to adapt the setup to
the experimental constraints, we automatize D1’s decisions; specifically, we assume that
D1: (i) always invests; and (ii) selects the same upstream supplier as D2 under vertical
separation, and the integrated supplier UA otherwise.4 There are therefore three players,
4In ACR, D1 always invests in equilibrium, regardless of whether she is integrated. Furthermore, under
vertical separation, the two downstream competitors have the same objective and thus pick the cheaper
supplier when their offers differ; when instead the two suppliers offer the same terms, assuming that the
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UA, UB and D2,5 and the game is as follows:
• In stage 1, D2 decides whether to invest, at cost k; her decision, I ∈ {0, 1}, is publicly
observed.
• In stage 2, UA and UB each offer the required support, in exchange for a share of the
revenue; providing the support is costless, and we denote by s ∈ [s, s] ⊂ [0, 1] the
share left to the downstream competitors (no discrimination).
• In stage 3, D2 chooses one supplier; each Di (for i = 1, 2) then obtains ri (I) − c,
where c denotes the operating cost and r2 (1) > r2 (0) whereas r1 (1) < r1 (0): D2’s
investment increases her revenue but reduces her rival’s revenue.
The parameters satisfy:
s < s∗ ≡ k
r2(1)− r2(0) < s¯. (1)
This ensures that D2 invests if her share is large enough (namely, s > s∗), but does not
if her share is too low (s < s∗). We describe below the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
under vertical separation and integration.
2.1.2 Vertical separation
Consider first the case of vertical separation. D2’s net payoff depends on her investment
decision and on the share sh offered by the selected supplier, Uh (for h = A, B):
ΠD2 (sh, I) = shr2 (I)− c− kI. (2)
two downstream firms select the same supplier does not affect the equilibrium outcomes.
5For the sake of exposition, we will use “he” for UA (integrated or not) and UB, and “she” for D2.
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The selected supplier, Uh, receives a share 1 − sh of both downstream firms’ revenues,
and thus obtains:
ΠUh (sh, I) = (1− sh) [r1 (I) + r2 (I)] . (3)
In stage 2, upstream competition induces suppliers to leave the maximum share s to
the downstream firms; hence, there is no hold-up. It follows that D2 is indifferent between
the two suppliers in stage 3, and invests in stage 1 (as s > s∗).
2.1.3 Vertical integration
Suppose now that UA and D1 are vertically integrated. Regardless of whether UA is se-
lected by D2, the integrated firm receives the profit generated by his downstream division
D1, r1 (I)− c− k. D2’s payoff remains given by (2) and the selected supplier, Uh, receives
the share (1− sh) of D2’s revenue. Hence:
• If D2 selects UA, then the profit of the integrated firm is:
ΠUA−D1 (sA, I) = (1− sA) r2 (I) + r1(I)− c− k. (4)
• If instead D2 selects UB, then the profits of the integrated firm and of UB are respec-
tively given by:
ΠUA−D1 (sA, I) = r1(I)− c− k, (5)
ΠUB (sB, I) = (1− sB) r2 (I) . (6)
Upstream competition eliminates again any risk of hold-up (that is, both suppliers
offer to leave D2 the maximal share s) and D2 thus still invests.
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2.2 Commitment and Sabotage variants
We now introduce the possibility of commitment or sabotage in the above game.
2.2.1 Commitment
The Commitment game adds an ex ante stage 0 to the Benchmark game, in which sup-
pliers can commit themselves to being “greedy”. Specifically, in this stage 0, which takes
place before investment decisions, suppliers can commit themselves, if they wish so, to
leaving no more than s to the downstream competitors. Independent suppliers never
make such a commitment, as this would put them at a disadvantage in the competition
stage. Therefore, under vertical separation, the outcome remains as before: the suppliers
offer the maximal share s to D2, who thus invests.
Under vertical integration, however, it is optimal for the integrated UA to commit
himself in stage 0 to leaving s: this confers market power to UB who, in stage 2, offers
D2 a share only slightly higher than s. Anticipating this, D2 does not invest in stage 1,
which benefits the downstream subsidiary of the integrated firm UA − D1. Hence, in this
Commitment variant, vertical integration creates hold-up problems for the independent
rival, D2, who does not invest.
2.2.2 Sabotage
The Sabotage game adds instead an ex post stage 4 to the Benchmark game, in which, if
selected by D2, UA can “degrade” his support, which harms D2 but benefits D1. Specifi-
cally, if selected by D2 in stage 3, then in this stage 4 UA can engage in sabotage; exerting
this option costs C > 0 to UA and reduces D2’s revenue (regardless of UA’s initial offer)
to sˆr2(I), where sˆ < s∗, but gives D1 an extra benefit B > C.
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As sabotage is costly and brings no direct benefit, UA never degrades his support
when independent. Therefore, under vertical separation, the outcome still remains as in
the Benchmark game: the suppliers offer the maximal share s to D2, who invests.
By contrast, a vertically integrated UA has an incentive to sabotage the downstream
rival D2, as this brings a benefit B > C to his downstream subsidiary D1. As a result,
regardless of the offer made by UA, UB wins the competition by offering a share only
slightly higher than sˆ, and thus smaller than s∗; anticipating this, D2 does not invest in
stage 1, which benefits the downstream subsidiary of the integrated firm UA−D1. Hence,
in this Sabotage variant, vertical integration creates again hold-up problems for the inde-
pendent rival, D2, who does not invest. Note that, formally, there are multiple equilibria,
which only differ in the offer initially made by UA: offering any share constitutes an equi-
librium strategy.
3 Experimental design
To test the above theoretical predictions, we ran an experiment involving three players
(UA, UB and D2) and three treatments: Benchmark, Commitment and Sabotage. Each treat-
ment included a first phase with vertical separation (“VS”) and a second phase with ver-
tical integration (“VI”) between UA and D1. Each phase lasted for ten periods.
We now present in detail the parameters and payoffs used in each treatment.
3.1 Parameters
To expedite the decision process, we discretized the set of sharing rules. However, to limit
the emergence of cooperative strategies, we maintained a substantial number of options
(namely, nine). Furthermore, to ensure equilibrium uniqueness, we introduced a cap on
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the offered share.6 Specifically, the set of possible sharing rules is:
S ≡ {50%; 55%; 60%; 65%; 70%; 75%; 80%; 85%; 90%}.
Firms’ profits are based on the following underlying symmetric specification:
- Di’s revenue is rˆ
(
Iˆi, Iˆj
)
= Iˆi
(
a− bIˆi − bIˆj
)
, for i 6= j ∈ {i, j}, with Iˆ1 = I and Iˆ2
equal to either I (if D2 “invests”) or I (if D2 “does not invest”); Di’s cost is kˆ Iˆi.
- The parameters are a = 140, b = 33, kˆ = 45, I = 0.3, and I = 1;7 it can be checked
that D2 is indifferent between investing or not for s∗ ' 70%.
- Sabotage costs and benefits are C = 5 and B = 10.
To avoid biases against actions that may generate negative profits (see Dufwenberg
et al., 2007), we added fixed payments to these payoffs. Specifically: (i) D2 obtains a
fixed payment F = 9, regardless of players’ actions; and (ii) suppliers also obtain a fixed
payment f = 2 in case they are not selected.8
In the experiment, players were provided with tables describing the resulting payoffs
as a function of the three players’ strategies. These payoff tables were common knowl-
edge and all decisions were made public inside every three-player group. In addition,
each player learnt her or his own payoff.
We now present the payoff tables.
6If suppliers can offer a share of 100%, two equilibria exist under vertical separation: one in which
suppliers offer 100% and obtain zero profit, and another one in which they offer the next-best share and
receive a positive expected profit.
7The operating cost thus corresponds to c = kˆI = 13.5, whereas k = kˆ
(
I − I) = 31.5, r1(1) = r2(1) =
rˆ
(
I, I
)
= 74, r1(0) = rˆ
(
I, I
)
= 97.1, and r2(0) = rˆ
(
I, I
)
= 29.13. The resulting payoffs have been rounded.
8 Limiting the payment to these instances reduced the financial cost without affecting the equilibria.
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3.2 Payoff tables
3.2.1 Benchmark treatment
Table 1 presents D2’s payoffs (in euros) for the Benchmark treatment, as a function of D2’s
investment decision, I ∈ {0, 1}, and of the obtained share, s.
Table 1: Payoff of D2 in the Benchmark treatment under VS and VI
s 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
I = 0 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
I = 1 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
Under vertical separation, D1 automatically selects the same supplier as D2. Table 2
presents the payoff of the selected supplier, as a function of the offered share, s.
Table 2: Payoff of the selected supplier in the Benchmark treatment under VS
s 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
I = 0 63 57 50 44 38 32 25 19 13
I = 1 74 67 59 52 44 37 30 22 15
Under vertical integration, D1 automatically selects UA as supplier, and UA internal-
izes D1’s profit, which is presented in Table 3. In addition, the supplier selected by D2
(UA or UB) obtains the payoff presented in Table 4.
Table 3: Payoff for UA generated by D1 in the Benchmark treatment under VI
I = 0 52
I = 1 29
Finally, under both vertical separation and vertical integration, the supplier not se-
lected by D2 receives the participation fee f = 2.
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Table 4: Payoff of the supplier selected by D2 in the Benchmark treatment under VI
s 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
I = 0 15 13 12 10 9 7 6 4 3
I = 1 37 33 30 26 22 19 15 11 7
3.2.2 Commitment treatment
In the Commitment treatment, stage 0 is added in which UA chooses whether or not to
commit to leaving downstream firms the smallest possible share, s = 50%. The three
stages of the benchmark game are then played, with the caveat that, in stage 2, UA does
not make any choice if he already committed himself in stage 0. The payoffs of all players
are the same as in the Benchmark treatment.
3.2.3 Sabotage treatment
In the Sabotage treatment, stage 4 is added in which, whenever selected by D2, UA
chooses whether or not to use “option S”.9 The payoffs of D2 are the same as in the
Benchmark case, except if she selects UA and UA uses option S: in this case, D2’s payoff
only depends on her investment decision and is presented in Table 5.10
Table 5: Payoff of D2 in the Sabotage treatment if she selects UA and UA uses option S
I = 0 11
I = 1 3
Finally, the payoffs of the upstream firms are as in the Benchmark treatment, except
for the cost and benefit of option S, which are added to UA’s payoffs.
9The word “sabotage” is never mentioned in the experiment, because its negative connotation could
influence the subjects.
10The “sabotage” share sˆ has been set equal to 52.5%. Hence, if UB anticipates that UA engages in sabo-
tage, his optimal strategy is to offer 55% (as in the Commitment treatment).
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3.3 Predictions
Under vertical separation, Bertrand competition leads suppliers to offer the highest pos-
sible share, 90%, and D2 always invests. Vertical integration does not affect this outcome
in the Benchmark treatment. By contrast, in the other two treatments vertical integration
discourages D2 from investing. In the Commitment treatment, the integrated supplier
UA commits himself to leaving a 50% share. In the Sabotage treatment, if UA were se-
lected by D2, then he would choose option S. As a result, in both treatments UB wins the
competition for D2 but leaves her a share of only 55%, and D2 does not invest. Table 6
summarizes the equilibrium outcomes.
Table 6: Equilibrium outcomes for all treatments and phases
Treatment Phase Stage Player Action Payoff
Benchmark VS and VI
1 D2 invests
2 UA ; UB 90% ; 90% 15 ; 2a
3 D2 UA or UB 31
Commitment
VS
0 UA does not commit
1 D2 invests
2 UA ; UB 90% ; 90% 15 ; 2a
3 D2 UA or UB 31
VI
0 UA commits to 50%
1 D2 does not invest
2 UA ; UB [no decision] ; 55% 54 ; 13
3 D2 UB 12
Sabotage
VS
1 D2 invests
2 UA ; UB 90% ; 90% 15 ; 2a
3 D2 UA or UB 31
4 UA (if he were selected) does not use S
VI
1 D2 does not invest
2 UA ; UB any s ∈ S ; 55% 54 ; 13
3 D2 UB 12
4 UA (if he were selected) uses S
a The first number is the payoff of the supplier selected by D2.
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3.4 Procedures
We now describe the organization of the experimental sessions. Each session is dedicated
to one treatment, first played for ten periods under vertical separation, followed by ten
periods under vertical integration. Each subject participates in only one session (but plays
both phases). Thirty subjects are active in each session: 10 for UA, 10 for UB, and 10
for D2. Each subject is randomly assigned a role (UA, UB or D2) and keeps the same
role for the whole session. At the beginning of each period, groups of 3 subjects are
constituted; these three subjects interact during that period and no communication is
allowed between them. In order to limit the scope for repeated interaction, we use a
perfect stranger matching protocol between UA and UB, ensuring that these subjects meet
only once within each phase; in each period, D2 subjects are then randomly matched with
the couples of UA and UB subjects. At the end of each period, each subject learns his or
her own payoff for that period, as well as all decisions made by the three subjects in the
group during that period. The instructions for each treatment are presented in Online
appendix A.
At the end of the twenty periods, one period is randomly chosen, and each subject
earns the payoff obtained in that period. Subjects are then asked to answer a series of
questions about their age, sex and occupation; they are also asked to situate themselves on
a 0 to 10 risk-aversion scale ranging from “ready to take risks” to “not ready to take risks
at all” (Dohmen et al., 2005). Finally, they are asked to answer three standard questions,
and we used the number of correct answers as an IQ score (from 0 to 3).11
We conducted nine sessions (three per treatment) at Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, from
April 2015 to April 2017. In total, 270 subjects participated. The sessions lasted between
11See Appendix A for more details on the IQ questionnaire.
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90 and 120 minutes, including time for instructions. On average, subjects earned 25.18
euros (including a show-up fee of 5 euros). The experiments were programmed using
the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects included both Polytechnique stu-
dents (undergraduate and graduate students in engineering), and employees of the Ecole
Polytechnique.12 32% were female (41% in the Benchmark treatment, 30% in the Com-
mitment treatment and 26% in the Sabotage treatment) and 32% were employees (40%
in the Benchmark treatment, 28% in the Commitment treatment and 29% in the Sabotage
treatment). The average answer to the question on risk-aversion is 5.75 (5.58 in the Bench-
mark treatment, 5.96 in the Commitment treatment, and 5.72 in the Sabotage treatment).
Finally, the average IQ is 1.94 (1.65 in the Benchmark treatment, 2.13 in the Commitment
treatment, and 2.04 in the Sabotage treatment).
Most of the students at Ecole Polytechnique are male (in our sample, 21% of students
are female, whereas 56% of employees are female); hence, gender and occupation (student
or employee) are highly correlated (and occupation is itself highly correlated with age).13
We also observe that IQ is highly correlated with these two variables (Pearson correlation
tests are presented in appendix B). In our analysis, we have chosen to control for the in-
dividuals’ IQ level (which has a broader range than the binary variables). When using a
Mann-Whitney ranksum test, we observe significant differences between the Benchmark
treatment and each of the Commitment and Sabotage treatments (p < 0.05), but no dif-
ference between the Commitment and Sabotage treatments (p = 0.5691). However, when
using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the IQ is not significantly different across the three
12An additional session has been conducted for each of the Commitment and Sabotage treatments. How-
ever, due to schedule constraints, these two sessions differed from the others in terms of percentage of
students and IQ level. For reliability purposes, we dropped the session with an average IQ of 2.57 for the
Commitment treatment and of 1.20 for the Sabotage treatment, which correspond to the two extreme values
among all sessions. Including these two sessions does not affect the qualitative results.
13Students are aged between 18 and 27.
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treatments. Finally, no significant difference in risk-aversion is observed across the three
treatments (using both a Mann-Whitney ranksum test and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
4 Results and insights
We now study the impact of vertical integration on subjects’ decisions. We first observe in
Section 4.1 that, as predicted by the theory, vertical integration creates hold-up problems
in the Commitment and Sabotage treatments. There are some departures from theory,
however, which we investigate in Section 4.2; we find that vertical integration increases
these departures for UA subjects in the Commitment treatment and for UB and D2 sub-
jects in the Sabotage treatment. Finally, Section 4.3 explores possible rationales for these
departures.
For each variable of interest, we first present the evolution of the mean value within
each treatment. To study further the impact of vertical integration, we then report its
marginal effect, using probit regressions for the binary variables14 and OLS regressions
for the shares offered and accepted. In a first step, we control for session fixed effects and,
as subjects make repeated decisions during a session, we evaluate standard errors using
clusters at the individual level (see model I in the tables).15 In a second step, we also
control for decision makers’ IQ and risk-aversion (model II in the tables).16 The results
show that this does not materially affect the impact of vertical integration. We also check
for learning effects by ignoring the first two periods of each phase, and find that they do
14For probit regressions, we compute average marginal effects: we first compute the marginal effect for
each subject, before aggregating across subjects; see Williams (2012) for details of the method.
15Because some D2 subjects may interact more than once with UA or UB subjects during a session, we
provide in Online Appendix C a robustness check using clusters at the session level; the results are qualita-
tively the same.
16Controlling for the IQ and risk aversion of all subjects in the group yields the same results; see model
III in Online Appendix C.
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not qualitatively affect the results in any of the three treatments.17
4.1 Hold-up
4.1.1 Investment decisions
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the proportion of D2 subjects who invest. In the verti-
cal separation phase (VS hereafter, corresponding to the first ten periods), the three treat-
ments generate similar investments: about 82% of D2 subjects invest in the Benchmark
treatment and Commitment treatments, and 92% in the Sabotage treatment. In the ver-
tical integration phase (VI hereafter, last ten periods), this proportion remains about the
same in the Benchmark treatment (90%), but becomes much lower in the Commitment
(32%) and Sabotage (52%) treatments.
Figure 1: Evolution of investment
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Vertical Separation Vertical Integration
P r
o p
o r
t i o
n  
o f
 D
2
w
h o
 i n
v e
s t
 
Period
Benchmark Commitment Sabotage
Table 7 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on D2 subjects’ investment
decisions, based on a probit regression for each treatment. The results are in accordance
17See Online Appendix C.
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with theory. In the Benchmark treatment, vertical integration does not reduce investment;
it actually appears to become slightly higher, which may reflect a learning effect, as the
observed behavior gets closer to the prediction. By contrast, vertical integration reduces
the probability of investment in the other two treatments, by 43% in the Commitment
treatment and 37% in the Sabotage treatment – given the standard errors, this reduction
is not significantly different between the two treatments.
Table 7: Marginal effect of vertical integration on investment (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Commitment -0.428∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030)
Sabotage -0.367∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.052)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
These findings can be summarized as:
Result 1 (investment decisions). In line with theoretical predictions, vertical integration
does not affect investment decisions in the Benchmark treatment but makes D2 subjects less likely
to invest in the Commitment and Sabotage treatments.
4.1.2 Revenue sharing
Figure 2 displays the evolution of D2’s share. Under VS, the three treatments yield similar
shares: about 85% in the Benchmark treatment, 84% in the Commitment treatment, and
86% in the Sabotage treatment. Under VI, the share remains about the same in the Bench-
mark treatment (86%) but becomes much lower in the Sabotage treatment (75%) and even
18
more so in the Commitment treatment (64%).
Figure 2: Evolution of the share accepted by D2
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Table 8 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on the share obtained by
D2, based on an OLS regression for each treatment. The results are again in accordance
with theory: vertical integration has no significant effect on D2’s share in the Benchmark
treatment, but reduces it in the Sabotage treatment (by 10 percentage points) and even
more so in the Commitment treatment (by 20 percentage points).
Table 8: Marginal effect of vertical integration on the share accepted by D2 (OLS model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark 0.600 0.600
(0.553) (0.554)
Commitment -20.12∗∗∗ -20.12∗∗∗
(1.282) (1.284)
Sabotage -10.45∗∗∗ -10.45∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.183)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
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These findings can be summarized as:
Result 2 (revenue sharing). In line with theoretical predictions, vertical integration has no
effect on the share obtained by D2 subjects in the Benchmark treatment, but reduces it in the Com-
mitment and Sabotage treatments; this decrease is however more pronounced in the Commitment
than in the Sabotage treatment.
4.1.3 Suppliers’ behavior
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the shares offered by UA and UB. Under VS, the three
treatments yield similar shares for both suppliers: their average shares range from 80%
to 84% in the three treatments. Under VI, these shares remain similar in the Benchmark
treatment (82% for UA and 81% for UB). By contrast, they decrease in the Commitment
treatment (58% and 62%, respectively) and the share offered by UB also decreases in the
Sabotage treatment (68%).18
Table 9 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on the shares offered by the
two suppliers, based on an OLS regression. The results are still in line with theory. There
is no significant effect in the Benchmark treatment; by contrast, vertical integration re-
duces the share offered by both suppliers in the Commitment treatment, and the share
offered by UB in the Sabotage treatment. In the Commitment treatment, the evolution is
primarily driven by the proportion of UA subjects who choose to commit to a 50% share,
which increases from 8% under VS to 72% under VI. Vertical integration thus reduces the
share offered by UA,19 and in response UB also offers a lower share.20 In the Sabotage
18Recall that, in the Sabotage treatment, there is no theoretical prediction about the share offered by UA
– any share can be offered in equilibrium; the observed shares (84%) are similar to those under VS.
19We present in appendix C the results of a probit regression for UA subjects’ commitment decisions,
finding a marginal effect of vertical integration of 48% (see table 23). We also ran an OLS regression for
the shares offered by those UA subjects who did not commit to offering a 50% share, and find that vertical
integration generates a significant but small decrease of 3% (see table 24).
20The average share offered by UB drops from 75% in the absence of commitment by UA to 57% in case
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Figure 3: Effect of vertical integration on offered shares
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treatment, the evolution is primarily driven by the threat of sabotage. Indeed, the pro-
portion of UA subjects who choose the sabotage option when selected increases from 10%
under VS to 78% under VI.21 Anticipating this threat of sabotage by UA, UB offers a lower
share.
Table 9: Marginal effect of vertical integration on offered shares (OLS model)
UA UB
Model I Model II Model I Model II
Benchmark 0.983 0.983 -1.183 -1.183
(0.993) (0.995) (1.054) (1.056)
Commitment -22.583∗∗∗ -22.583∗∗∗ -18.1∗∗∗ -18.1∗∗∗
(2.688) (2.692) (1.416) (1.418)
Sabotage 0.217 0.217 -13.633∗∗∗ -13.633∗∗∗
(1.100) (1.102) (1.823) (1.826)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses; ∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
of commitment.
21We present in Appendix C the results of a probit regression for UA subjects’ sabotage decisions when
selected, finding a marginal effect of vertical integration of 46% (see table 25).
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These findings can be summarized as:
Result 3 (suppliers’ behavior). In line with theoretical predictions, vertical integration
has no effect on the shares offered by the suppliers in the Benchmark treatment, but reduces them
in the Commitment treatment and reduces the shares offered by UB in the Sabotage treatment.
Furthermore:
• in the Commitment treatment, vertical integration increases the proportion of UA subjects
who commit themselves to offering a 50% share;
• in the Sabotage treatment, vertical integration increases the proportion of UA subjects who
choose the option S when selected by D2.
• the reduction in the share offered by UB is more pronounced in the Commitment than in the
Sabotage treatment.
4.2 Individual departures from theory
The decisions observed in the experiment are thus broadly in line with theoretical predic-
tions: vertical integration has no significant effect in the Benchmark treatment but creates
hold-up problems in the Commitment and Sabotage treatments. Still, some discrepancies
can be noted. Although in theory vertical integration has the same impact in the Commit-
ment and Sabotage treatments, we observe a larger impact on the shares offered by UB
and those obtained by D2 in the former treatment. The picture is less clear for investment.
Figure 1 displays an investment rate that, under VI, remains about 10 points higher in the
Sabotage than in the Commitment treatment; yet Table 7 shows that the marginal effect of
vertical integration on investment is not significantly different across treatments. How-
ever, the sequence of decisions varies in the two treatments. In the Sabotage treatment,
22
the investment decision is made first and is thus entirely attributable to D2. By contrast,
in the Commitment treatment, UA moves first and can therefore influence D2’s invest-
ment decision. This is confirmed by Table 10 which shows that, regardless of the phase,
UA’s commitment decision has a significant and substantial effect on the other subjects’
decisions.
Table 10: Marginal effect of UA’s commitment (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Investment -0.500∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013)
Share offered by UB -22.851∗∗∗ -22.874∗∗∗
(1.666) (1.657)
Share accepted by D2 -28.502∗∗∗ -28.536∗∗∗
(2.250) (2.232)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
This leads us to investigate the individual contributions of UA, UB and D2 subjects
to the observed discrepancies. To this end, for each decision of interest, we first build
a binary deviation score reflecting whether this decision substantially departs from the-
ory, and present its average value for each treatment and phase. We then compute the
marginal effect of vertical integration on this deviation score.
4.2.1 UA subjects
Hold-up decisions For UA subjects’ “hold-up” decisions over commitment or sabotage,
we define the deviation score σHA as follows:
- Commitment treatment: σHA = 1 when UA opts for the commitment option under
VS, and does not do so under VI; σHA = 0 otherwise;
23
- Sabotage treatment, if UA is selected:22 σHA = 1 when UA opts for the sabotage
option under VS, and does not do so under VI; σHA = 0 otherwise.
Table 11 shows that, under VS, the average value of this deviation score is less than
0.1 in both treatments; by contrast, under VI it jumps to 0.28 in the Commitment and 0.22
in the Sabotage treatments.23
Table 11: Average deviation score of UA (σHA )
Treatment Phase P1 to P10 P3 to P10
Commitment VS 0.08 0.08
VI 0.28 0.28
Sabotage VS 0.10 0.07
(for selected UA) VI 0.22 0.19
Table 12 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on σHA . Vertical integration
increases the probability that UA deviates by 20 percentage points in the Commitment
treatment; it has instead no significant effect in the Sabotage treatment.
Table 12: Marginal effect of vertical integration on σHA (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Commitment 0.198∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.073)
Sabotage 0.115 0.108
(0.078) (0.071)
IQ and Risk aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
Shares offered We now turn to the shares offered by UA subjects. In the Benchmark
treatment, and in the Commitment treatment for subjects that did not exert the hold-up
22UA is selected by 40% of D2 subjects under VS and by 26% under VI.
23Two average values are reported: for all periods (P1 to P10) and, to account for potential learning
effects, for the last eight periods of each session and phase (P3 to P10).
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option,24 we define the deviation score σOA as follows:
- σOA = 1 when UA chooses a share in [50%, 75%];
25
- σOA = 0 otherwise.
Table 13 shows that the average value of this deviation score is about 0.2 in both phases
of the Benchmark treatment. In the Commitment treatment, it remains about the same
(0.16) under VS, whereas it almost doubles (0.28) under VI.
Table 13: Average deviation score for the shares offered by UA
(
σOA
)
Treatment Phase P1 to P10 P3 to P10
Benchmark VS 0.21 0.16
VI 0.20 0.18
Commitment VS 0.16 0.09
(for non-committed UA) VI 0.28 0.30
Table 14 shows that vertical integration has no marginal effect on σOA in the Benchmark
treatment, and no significant effect either in the Commitment treatment.
Table 14: Marginal effect of vertical integration on σ0A (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark -0.007 -0.004
(0.049) (0.049)
Commitment (for non-committed UA) 0.096 0.082
(0.078) (0.063)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses.
We can summarize these findings as follows:
24These are the only relevant cases: UA subjects who exert the commitment option have no other decision
to make and, in the Sabotage treatment, UA can offer any share in equilibrium when integrated.
25We allow for small "trembles" (namely, up to 10 percentage points) around the equilibrium share and
thus only consider larger deviations as departures from theory.
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Insight 1 (UA subjects). Vertical integration increases departures from theory in UA sub-
jects’ hold-up decisions in the Commitment treatment, but has no such effect in the Sabotage
treatment. In addition, vertical integration has no effect on departures from theory in the shares
offered by UA subjects in the relevant treatments (Commitment and Benchmark).
4.2.2 UB subjects
Shares offered We similarly define a deviation score, σOB , for the shares offered by UB
subjects, which is equal to 1 in the following instances (and to 0 otherwise):
- Benchmark treatment: when UB chooses a share in [50%, 75%];
- Commitment treatment: when UB chooses a share in [70%, 90%] if UA opted for the
commitment option, and in [50%, 75%] if UA did not do so;
- Sabotage treatment: whenUB chooses a share in [50%, 75%] under VS, and in [70%, 90%]
under VI.
Table 15 shows that the average value of this deviation score ranges between 0.19 and
0.28, except in the Sabotage treatment under VI where it jumps to 0.51.
Table 15: Average deviation score for the shares offered by UB
(
σOB
)
Treatment Phase P1 to P10 P3 to P10
Benchmark VS 0.24 0.20
VI 0.28 0.23
Commitment VS 0.21 0.15
VI 0.21 0.20
Sabotage VS 0.19 0.12
VI 0.51 0.53
Table 16 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on σOB . Vertical integration
increases UB subjects’ deviations by 30 percentage points in the Sabotage treatment; by
contrast, it has no effect in the Benchmark and Commitment treatments.
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Table 16: Marginal effect of vertical integration on σOB (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark 0.038 0.038
(0.052) (0.051)
Commitment 0.002 0.004
(0.041) (0.041)
Sabotage 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057)
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
We can summarize these findings as follows:
Insight 2 (UB subjects). Vertical integration increases departures from theory in the shares
offered by UB subjects in the Sabotage treatment, but has no effect in the other two treatments.
4.2.3 D2 subjects
Investment decision The deviation score for D2 subjects’ investment decisions, σID, is
equal to 1 in the following instances (and to 0 otherwise):
- Benchmark treatment: when D2 does not invest;
- Commitment treatment: when D2 invests if UA chose to commit himself, and D2
does not invest if UA chose instead not to commit himself;
- Sabotage treatment: when D2 does not invest under VS, and invests under VI.
Table 17 shows that the average value of this deviation score is low under VS (ranging
from 0.08 in the Sabotage treatment to 0.18 in the Benchmark treatment). Under VI, this
average score remains low in the Benchmark and the Commitment treatments, but jumps
to 0.52 in the Sabotage treatment.26
26This average score is only slightly lower, namely 0.49, if we ignore the first two periods.
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Table 17: Average deviation score for D2’s investment decision (σID)
Treatment Phase P1 to P10 P3 to P10
Benchmark VS 0.18 0.16
VI 0.10 0.08
Commitment VS 0.15 0.12
VI 0.18 0.15
Sabotage VS 0.08 0.06
VI 0.52 0.49
Table 18 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on σID. Vertical integration
increases D2 subjects’ deviations in their investment decisions by 39 percentage points in
the Sabotage treatment, and has no effect in the Commitment treatment.27
Table 18: Marginal effect of vertical integration on σID (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark -0.080∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Commitment 0.028 0.028
(0.036) (0.035)
Sabotage 0.389∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
Choice of supplier We now define a deviation score, σUD , for D2 subjects’ choice of sup-
plier:
- in the Sabotage treatment, under VI, σUD = 1 whenever D2 chooses UA even though
UB offered at least 55%, and σUD = 0 otherwise;
- in the other treatments, as well as under VS in the Sabotage treatment, σUD = 1 if D2
chooses the supplier who offered the lower share, and σUD = 0 otherwise.
27In the Benchmark treatment, we observe a small positive effect which probably reflects a learning effect
similar to that observed in Table 7.
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Table 19 shows that the average value of this deviation score is always lower than 0.1
except in the Sabotage treatment under VI, where it reaches 0.24.
Table 19: Average deviation score for D2’s choice of supplier (σUD )
Treatment Phase P1 to P10 P3 to P10
Benchmark VS 0.06 0.06
VI 0.04 0.04
Commitment VS 0.02 0.01
VI 0.06 0.06
Sabotage VS 0.10 0.10
VI 0.24 0.20
Table 20 reports the marginal effect of vertical integration on σUD . Vertical integration
increases D2 subjects’ deviations in the choice of their suppliers by 14 percentage points in
the Sabotage treatment; it has instead only a barely significant, small effect in the Commit-
ment treatment. In the Benchmark treatment, there is a small negative impact, probably
reflecting again a learning effect.
Table 20: Marginal effect of vertical integration on σUD (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Benchmark -0.024∗ -0.025∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Commitment 0.043∗ 0.044∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Sabotage 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ and ∗ represent significance at 1% and 10% levels.
We can summarize these findings as follows:
Insight 3. Vertical integration increases D2 subjects’ departures from theory (investment
decisions and choices of supplier) in the Sabotage treatment, but has no substantial effect in the
29
other two treatments.
4.2.4 Interplay between individual departures
The above analysis shows that vertical integration increases D2 and UB subjects’ depar-
tures from theory in the Sabotage treatment, whereas it increases UA subjects’ departures
from theory in their commitment decisions. We conclude this analysis with an exploration
of the interplay between these individual departures.
Specifically, we now study the marginal effect of every σ ∈ Σ ≡ {σHA , σOB , σID}28 on
every subsequent σ′ ∈ Σ in the same period.29 In order to identify such interplay in its
purest form, we focus on pairs of decisions and restrict attention to situations in which
the third decision did not depart from theory. We further focus on vertical integration
because, under VS, the few statistically significant effects either do not differ between the
Commitment and Sabotage treatments, or rely on too few departures for a meaningful
interpretation of the results (see Appendix D).
Table 21 reports the results. σID has a highly significant impact on σ
O
B in the Sabo-
tage treatment; conversely, σHA has a highly significant impact on σ
O
B in the Commitment
treatment. This leads to:
28 We do not consider UA subjects’ departures in the offered shares (σOA ), as they cannot be defined for
committed subjects in the Commitment treatment, as well as under VI in the Sabotage treatment. Similarly,
we do not consider D2 subjects’ departures in the choice of supplier (σUD ), because they are mostly observed
in the Sabotage treatment under VI (see Table 19), where they constitute a prerequisite for an error in
sabotage decisions and are therefore highly correlated with σHA .
29Recall that the experiment is designed to avoid dynamic effects across periods: a perfect stranger pro-
tocol ensures that each UA and each UB only meet once, and D2 is randomly matched with a couple of UA
and UB subjects. We nevertheless studied the impact of one subject’s decision on another subject’s subse-
quent decision in the following period and found that the only effects were mirror images of the interplay
observed within the same period (see Online Appendix D). For instance, for D2 and UB subjects paired in
period t, departures in the shares offered in period t, σOB (t), are correlated with subsequent departures in in-
vestment decisions (by the same D2 subjects) in period t+ 1, σID(t+ 1); this however reflects the correlation
between the subjects’ decisions in period t, σID(t) and σ
O
B (t), combined with an auto-correlation between
D2 subjects’ decisions across periods, σID(t) and σ
I
D(t+ 1).
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Table 21: Interplay between subsequent departures under VI (Probit model)
Commitment Sabotage
σHA on σ
O
B (if σ
I
D = 0 ) 0.262
∗∗∗
(0.040)
σOB on σ
H
A (if UA is selected and σ
I
D = 0) (a)
σHA on σ
I
D 0.034
(0.073)
σID on σ
H
A (if UA is selected and σ
O
B = 0) -0.184
(0.118)
σID on σ
O
B (if σ
H
A = 0) -0.014
(0.026)
σID on σ
O
B 0.175
∗∗∗
(0.059)
Notes: (a) There is a single occurrence in which σDI = 0, σ
O
B = 1 and UA is selected
(the UA subject then deviated).
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
Insight 4. Under vertical integration:
(i) In the Sabotage treatment, D2’s decisions to invest are positively correlated with UB subse-
quently offering too high shares in the same period; by contrast, in the Commitment treat-
ment, no correlation is observed.
(ii) In the Commitment treatment, UA’s decisions not to commit themselves are positively cor-
related with UB subsequently offering too low shares in the same period.
4.3 Behavioral approaches
The above analysis shows that vertical integration has no substantial impact on individ-
ual departures from theory in the Benchmark treatment. In the other treatments, however,
the analysis highlights two countervailing forces. In the Commitment treatment, vertical
integration generates more departures in UA subjects’ hold-up decisions (Insight 1). In
the Sabotage treatment, vertical integration triggers instead more departures in the in-
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vestments made by D2 subjects and in the shares offered by UB subjects (Insights 2 and
3). Finally, we find a positive correlations, within periods and under VI, between UA and
UB subjects’ departures in the Commitment treatment (Insight 4 (i)), and between D2 and
UB subjects’ departures in the Sabotage treatment (Insight 4 (ii)).
In what follows we consider different behavioral approaches that may explain why
vertical integration has a different impact on individual departures from theory in the
Commitment and Sabotage treatments.30 We explore below both classic bounded ratio-
nality and social preference approaches. The level-k theory can explain the first of these
results (Insight 1) but not the others. Social preferences can instead explain Insights 2
to 4 (i). Finally, Insight 4 (ii) can be derived from an alternative bounded rationality ap-
proach.
4.3.1 Level-k theory
A classic bounded rationality approach, referred to as level-k theory, consists in introduc-
ing an iterative decision process where players vary in “depth”, that is, in their levels
of thinking (see for instance Stahl (1993) and Nagel (1995)).31 The iterative process be-
gins with “level-0” types who are not strategic and pick an arbitrary decision – we will
assume here that they randomly choose every action with equal probability. “Level-1”
players then best respond to “level-0” players, and so on.32 In our framework, the main
30Following the observations mentioned in footnote 28, for D2’s decisions we focus on departures in
investment decisions
(
σID
)
and ignore those in the choice of supplier (σUD ); for UA’s decisions we focus on
departures in hold-up decisions
(
σHA
)
and ignore those in the offered share (σOA ).
31Another classic approach that takes decision errors into account is the quantal-response equilibrium
analysis (see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Normann (2011)). This approach generalizes the Nash equi-
librium by assuming that players do not choose the best response with probability one but still choose
better choices more frequently. Unfortunately, this approach is difficult to apply to multi-stage games such
as the one studied here.
32For simplicity, we assume that each level-k player anticipates that the others are of a homogeneous
level-(k− 1) type. Introducing heterogeneity between players, as often done in level-k analysis, would not
change the insights.
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predictions are as follows.33
In the Sabotage treatment, on level 1, anticipating a random supplier selection by D2,
both suppliers offer the lowest share. However, from level 1 onward UA, whenever se-
lected by D2, always uses the S option under VI, and never uses it under VS. As a result
under VI, from level 2 onward UB offers a low share and, anticipating this, D2 stops in-
vesting, as predicted by theory. By contrast, under VS, the shares offered by the two
suppliers progressively increase from level 2 onward and coincide with theory from level
10 onward; as a result, investment occurs with certainty from level 7 onward.
In the Commitment treatment, on level 1, anticipating again a random supplier selec-
tion by D2, both suppliers offer the lowest share. Under VS, UA never commits himself
from level 2 onward; thus, as in the Sabotage treatment, competition drives the offered
shares to increase gradually (they coincide with theory from level 9 onward) and D2 in-
vests from level 7 onward. Under VI, UA does not commit himself from level 2 to 6; as a
result, the offered shares evolve as under VS, and D2 does not invest until level 6, where
she invests with probability 1/2. It is only from level 7 onward that UA commits himself
to offering a low share; this then induces UB to offer a low share and discourages D2 from
investing, as predicted by theory.
According to this level-k analysis, an independent UA never engages in hold-up from
level 2 onward; by contrast, there is a substantial difference in an integrated UA’s hold-up
decisions across treatments: in the Sabotage treatment, predictions are in line with theory
from level 1 onward, whereas in the Commitment treatment departures from theory keep
occurring up to level 6. These patterns are in line with Insight 1.
By contrast, level-k theory predicts the same impact of vertical integration on D2’s
investment decisions in the two treatments: investment occurs from level 7 onward under
33See Appendix E.
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VS and, under VI, D2 behaves as predicted by theory from level 2 onward. Level-k theory
thus cannot explain Insight 3.
Finally, according to the level-k analysis, in the two treatments under VS, the share
offered by UB progressively increases and coincides with theory from level 9 onward.
Under VI, in the Sabotage treatment the share offered by UB coincides with theory from
level 2 onward; by contrast, in the Commitment treatment, as UA commits himself only
from level 7 onward, level-k theory predicts more generous shares than theory from level
2 to 6. Hence, level-k theory not only cannot explain Insight 2, which finds that vertical in-
tegration triggers less generous offers in the Commitment than in the Sabotage treatment,
but actually goes in the opposite direction.34
Overall, the level-k analysis can explain Insight 1 about hold-up decisions but cannot
explain Insight 3 about D2’s investment behavior and actually contradicts Insight 2 about
UB’s offers. By the same token, this approach cannot explain Insight 4 either.
4.3.2 Social preferences
Insights 2 and 3 highlight that vertical integration triggers more departures from theory
for UB and D2 in the Sabotage treatment; by contrast, no such effect is observed in the
Commitment treatment. One major difference between the two treatments is that UB and
D2 face more strategic uncertainty35 about UA’s actions in the Sabotage treatment, where
UA’s hold-up decision occurs in the very last stage, than in the Commitment treatment,
where it occurs in the very first stage. This difference in the timing of the decisions can
play a role when there is uncertainty about UA’s behavior. Indeed, in the Sabotage treat-
ment, D2 invests more often and UB offers more generous shares than predicted; they
34Note that it is precisely for the levels (2 to 6) where level-k theory is in line with Insight 1 that it contra-
dicts Insight 3.
35See, e.g., Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Heinemann et al. (2009).
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thus behave as if they did not expect UA to systematically exert his hold-up option. A
natural interpretation is that they believe UA to have social preferences preventing him
from harming others.
The literature has indeed long recognized that individuals can be sensitive to fairness
and others’ payoffs and intentions.36 The above analysis of the departures from theory
also supports the possibility that UA subjects may exhibit such preferences. As can be
seen in Table 11, UA is much more likely not to exert his hold-up option under VI than he
is to exert it under VS: vertical integration increases the average value of σHA from 8% to
28% in the Commitment treatment and from 10% to 22% in the Sabotage treatment. This
suggests that a fraction of UA subjects are indeed reluctant to exert their hold-up options
– in both treatments.
This possibility of social preferences can explain the observed pattern in D2’s depar-
tures (Insight 3). Under VS, there are few departures in all treatments anyway. Under VI,
there are also few departures in the Commitment treatment, as the uncertainty about UA’s
preferences, and his willingness to exert the hold-up decision, is resolved before D2 has
to make her decision; by contrast, there are substantially more departures in the Sabotage
treatment, in which D2 must decide whether to invest and choose her supplier before the
resolution of the uncertainty about UA’s preferences.
A similar logic can explain the observed pattern in UB’s departure, with the caveat
that what matters for UB is D2’s beliefs about UA’s preferences, rather than UA’s actual
preferences or UB’s own beliefs about these preferences: it is when D2 dismisses the threat
of sabotage that UB must offer a generous share in order to be selected by D2. Interest-
36In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), individuals can be sensitive to inequity
aversion. Rabin (1993) focuses instead on reciprocity, whereas Falk and Fischbacher (2006) include both
aspects. Experimental studies support the existence of social preferences among individuals. Charness and
Rabin (2002) provide a direct test of the different theories on social preferences.
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ingly, the positive correlation between D2’s and UB’s departures (insight 4 (i)) supports
this interpretation: it is precisely when D2 invests, thereby signalling her optimism about
UA’s social preferences, that UB offers more generous shares. By contrast, in the Commit-
ment treatment, in which the uncertainty about UA’s preferences is resolved upfront, no
such correlation is observed.
To see this formally, in online Appendix F we introduce the possibility of social prefer-
ences in a model that follows the timing of the Sabotage treatment. Specifically, UA may
have social preferences, in which case he can never exert his hold-up option, and there
are two states of the world, in which UA has social preferences with different probabili-
ties. Finally, D2 is either optimistic or pessimistic about UA preferences. When making
her decision, D2 signals her belief, which in turn affects UB’s decision. This game has a
unique equilibrium, in which: (i) D2 always invests when optimistic, and does so only
with some probability when pessimistic; and (ii) UB always offers a low share when D2
does not invest, and a high share with positive probability otherwise. Thus, D2 and UB
both depart from the initial theory (Insights 2 and 3), and a departure by D2 moreover
increases the likelihood of a departure by UB (Insight 4 (i)).
The possibility of social preferences can therefore explain Insights 2 to 4 (i).37 By con-
trast, this approach cannot explain Insights 1 and 4 (ii), which involve UA’s own depar-
tures.38
37Combined with level-k theory, the two approaches can thus explain Insights 1 to 4 (i) if the impact of
social preferences on UB’s departures outweigh that of level-k theory.
38The above analysis concerns UB’s and D2’s beliefs about UA’s preferences, which cannot explain dif-
ferences in UA’s behavior across treatments. Introducing beliefs about UB’s or D2’s own preferences is
unlikely to explain differences across treatments, as these subjects play similar roles in all treatments.
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4.3.3 “Crazy” types
The previous approaches can explain all of our insights but Insight 4 (ii): in the Commit-
ment treatment, under VI, the likelihood that UB makes a generous offer is significantly
higher when UA does not commit himself than when he does. The expectation of persis-
tence in UA subjects’ errors may however explain this positive correlation.
Such expectation cannot affect UB’s behavior in the Sabotage treatment, where UB’s
own decision is concomitant with UA’s first decision. The same applies in the Commit-
ment treatment under VS, as UA has not subsequent decisions to make when departing
from theory on his first decision (namely, by committing himself). By contrast, under VI,
if UA departs from theory on his first decision (namely, by not committing himself), then
UB may expect UA to depart again from theory in the share offered to D2; as a result, UB
may offer a less generous share.
Introducing the possibility of “crazy" types39 for UA subjects thus provides an inter-
pretation of Insight 4 (ii). By contrast, it cannot explain Insight 1, as a crazy type is ex-
pected to depart more frequently from theory regardless of the phase or treatment. It
cannot explain Insights 2 and 3 either, as it generates the same effects on UB’s and D2’s
departures under VS and VI in the Sabotage treatment. Indeed, if D2 expects UA to be of
a crazy type, she will refrain from investing under VS and will be more prone to invest
under VI. And if observing that D2 departs from theory were to signal her belief that UA
is of a crazy type, then this would induce UB to depart as well in his own decision: he
would indeed offer a less generous share when D2 does not invest under VS, and a more
generous one when D2 invests under VI – this, in turn, is however consistent with Insight
4 (i).
39See Martin et al. (2001).
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5 Conclusion
ACR predicts that vertical integration creates hold-up problems when the integrated firm
competes both upstream and downstream. To test this theoretical prediction, we have
designed a laboratory experiment featuring two phases, a first one for vertical separation
followed by a second one for vertical integration. We study three treatments, in which a
downstream firm must invest before negotiating with two suppliers – one being always
independent, and the other being either independent or integrated with a rival of the
downstream firm. The Benchmark treatment does not include any hold-up option, and
vertical integration should therefore have no effect. The Commitment treatment enables
one supplier to engage in hold-up by pre-committing himself ex ante to appropriating part
of his customers’ profits. Finally, the Sabotage treatment enables instead the supplier to
degrade ex post his customers’ profits. Theory predicts that, in these last two treatments,
vertical integration induces the supplier to exert his hold-up option.
The laboratory data support the theoretical predictions about the impact of verti-
cal integration on hold-up. Yet, they also reveal some departures from theory. Interest-
ingly, these are more pronounced for the hold-up decision in the Commitment treatment,
whereas in the Sabotage treatment they are instead more pronounced for the investment
decision and for the contract terms offered by the independent supplier, and these depar-
tures are moreover positively correlated. We consider several behavioral approaches that
may explain these departures from theory. We find that bounded rationality (namely,
level-k theory) can explain the first observation; this is because the hold-up decision
comes earlier in the Commitment treatment, and thus involves higher levels of think-
ing. The introduction of social preferences for the supplier can instead explain the other
observations; this is because the hold-up decision comes later in the Sabotage treatment,
38
and thus exposes the other players to greater strategic uncertainty.
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Appendix
A IQ Questionnaire
The following three questions were asked. Each good answer yields one point, while each
wrong answer brings zero. The IQ score is the sum of the three.
1. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? . . . cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? . . . minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch
to cover half of the lake? . . . days
B Pearson correlation tests
Table 22: Pearson correlation coefficients
Female and Employee 0.382∗∗∗
Female and IQ −0.446∗∗∗
Employee and IQ −0.620∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
C Marginal effect of vertical integration on UA’s decisions
Table 23: Marginal effect of vertical integration on UA’s commitment (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Commitment 0.481∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
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Table 24: Marginal effect of VI on UA’s offered share when not commited (OLS model)
Model I Model II
Commitment -3.748∗∗ -3.540∗∗∗
(1.734) (1.271)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
Table 25: Marginal effect of VI on UA’s sabotage decision (Probit model)
Model I Model II
Sabotage 0.458∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018)
IQ and risk-aversion No Yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses;
∗∗∗ represents significance at 1% level.
D Interplay between σID, σ
O
B and σ
H
A under VS
Table 26 presents the interplays between σID, σ
O
B and σ
H
A under VS in t in the Commitment
and Sabotage treatments.
Table 26: Interplay between subsequent departures under VS (Probit model)
Commitment Sabotage
σID on σ
O
B 0.129
∗
(0.067)
σID on σ
O
B 0.145
∗
(0.078)
σHA on σ
I
D 0.199
∗∗∗
(0.066)
σID on σ
H
A (if UA selected and σ
O
B = 0) a
σHA on σ
O
B (if σ
I
D = 0) 0.093
(0.082)
σOB on σ
H
A (if UA selected and σ
I
D = 0) -0.009
(0.065)
Notes: a. σDI = 1 predicts σ
H
A = 0 perfectly.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗ and ∗ represent significance at 1% and 10% levels.
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E Level-k theory
For simplicity we assume that, for k ≥ 1, each level-k player believes that all the other
players are of level-(k− 1). We also assume that when indifferent between several ac-
tions, players randomly choose every action with equal probability. A more detailed,
step-by-step analysis is provided in Online Appendix B.
E.1 The Sabotage game
In the sabotage game, level-0 players play randomly under both VS and VI. In stage 1,
D2 invests with probability 1/2; in stage 2, both UA and UB select each of the 9 possible
sharing-rules with equal probability; in stage 3, D2 selects each supplier with equal prob-
ability, regardless of the shares offered; and whenever he is selected, in stage 4 UA uses
the sabotage option with probability 1/2.
From level-1 on, UA always uses the sabotage option when selected under VI, and
never uses it under VS.
On level-1, anticipating a random selection by D2, both suppliers offer the lowest share
(50%). Anticipating random offers and random use of the sabotage option by UA, D2
invests.40 In stage 3, D2 selects the offer from UA only if the expected profit she receives
from this offer with a probability 1/2 of sabotage is higher than the profit she receives
from the offer of UB.
From level-2 on, under VI, anticipating that UA will use the sabotage option whenever
selected, UB always offers 55% and D2 never invests. By contrast, under VS, the two
suppliers compete to supply D2, and the offered shares increase gradually: the better
offer reaches 70% on level-5 and 90% from level-9 on. D2 thus never invests before level-
6, and always invest from level-7 on.
E.2 The Commitment game
In the commitment game, level-0 players play again randomly under both VS and VI.
Hence, UA commits himself with probability 1/2 in stage 0 and D2 invests with proba-
bility 1/2 in stage 1; in stage 2, both UA (if not committed) and UB select each of the 9
possible sharing-rules with equal probability, and in stage 3, D2 selects each supplier with
equal probability, regardless of the shares offered.
On level 1, suppliers anticipate again a random selection by a level-0 D2. Hence, UB
offers the lowest (50%) whereas UA makes the commitment decision randomly and, if
not committed, offers 50% as well. Consider now by D2’s investment decision. If UA
has not committed himself in stage 0, D2 anticipates that both UA and UB will offer a
randomly chosen sharing rule. The probabilities that the best offer is a given sharing rule
are presented in Table 27. Given these probabilities, D2 invests (her expected profit is then
21.4 instead of 18 when she does not invest). By contrast, if UA has committed himself in
40D2’s expected profit is 16.64 if she does not invest, and 17.81 if she does.
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stage 0, then D2 anticipates that the best offer she will receive will be UB’s, which can be
any share with probability 1/9. Her expected profit is then 143/9 whether she invests or
not; D2 thus invests randomly and, in stage 3, selects the supplier who offered the higher
share.
Table 27: Level-1, probability of best offer being s
s 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Probability 181
3
81
5
81
7
81
9
81
11
81
13
81
15
81
17
81
On level-2, under both VS and VI, and regardless of UA’s commitment decision, D2
expects 50% shares from the level-1 suppliers, and does not invest. Similarly, UB expects
the level-1 UA to offer 50% and thus offers the next best share (55%) – offering 50% is
less profitable, as it reduces by half the selection probability. Likewise, UA chooses to not
commit himself, and offers a 55% share – committing himself would furthermore reduce
the probability of investment by the level-1 D2.
From level-3 on, under both VS and VI, commitment byUA discourages investment by
D2: UB’s best response to level-(k− 1) players’ strategies is then to offer a 55% share, and
D2’s is not to invest. However, an independent UA never commits himself: this would
yield the lowest possible payoff (2), whereas not committing and matching UB ’s offer,
for example, would yield a higher payoff with positive probability. Furthermore, absent
commitment, each supplier seeks to outbid his level-(k-1) rival; hence both suppliers’
offers increase gradually with k, reach 70% (the share that leaves D2 indifferent between
investing or not) when k = 5, and is maximal (90%) from level-10 on.
It follows that UA never commits before k = 7 (expecting no influence on investment,
this would only limit his ability to compete) and D2 never invests before before k = 6,
where it does so with probability 1/2. Differences between VS and VI appear from level-
7 on. Under VS, UA never commits himself, the suppliers compete and, anticipating
high enough offers from level-(k− 1) suppliers, D2 invests. Under VI, by contrast, UA
commits himself to prevent D2 from investing, as this strategy becomes more profitable
than competing to supply D2.41
F Social preferences
We propose here a stylized model showing that the introduction of (uncertain) social pref-
erences for UA can explain why, in the Sabotage treatment (but not in the Commitment
treatment), D2’s investing may induce UB to be generous. The intuition is that D2’s invest-
ment decision may convey some information about D2’s beliefs about UA’s preferences,
which induces UB to adjust his offer accordingly. For simplicity, UA is replaced by an
automatized robot, and UB has only two offers to choose from.
41For example, by committing himself on level-7 under VI, UA prevents D2 from investing and obtains
a profit of 54; he expects that not committing himself (and offering a 80% share) would instead induce the
level-6 D2 to invest with probability 1/2, giving him an expected profit of 51.
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F.1 Setting
• Players. There are two strategic players: UB and D2. In addition, D2 has access to an
outside option (standing for UA) which is “good” (θ = G) with probability x and “bad”
(θ = B) otherwise; a good outside option enables D2 to obtain a share sˆ ∈ (0, 1) of her
profit, whereas a bad outside option gives her zero profit.
• Information. At the beginning of the game, UB and D2 believe that the outside option is
good with probability xˆ. D2 then observes a binary signal σ ∈ {g, b}, distributed in such
a way that:42
• with probability λ ∈ (0, 1), D2 observes σ = g; it then becomes “optimistic ”and
believes that the outside option is good with probability xH ∈ (0, 1);
• with probability 1− λ, D2 observes σ = b; it then becomes “pessimistic” and be-
lieves that the outside option is good with lower probability xL ∈ (0, xH).
By construction, xˆ = λxH + (1− λ) xL. We moreover assume that D2 is likely to be
pessimistic:43
λ < λ¯ ≡ sH − sL
1− sL . (7)
• Decisions. D2 chooses whether or not to invest (at cost I > 0); she generates a profit
Π > 0 if she does not invest and Π+ ∆ > Π if she invests. UB chooses whether to offer
D2 a share sH ∈ (0, 1) or a lower share sL ∈ (0, xL).
• Payoffs. Let δ ∈ {0, 1} denote D2’s investment decision (where δ = 1 if D2 invests, and
δ = 0 otherwise), and s ∈ {sL, sH} denote the share offered by UB. The payoffs are as
follows:
• If D2 opts for the outside option, then D2 obtains sˆ (Π+ δ∆) − δI if the outside
option is of good quality and −δI otherwise; UB obtains 0.
• If instead D2 accepts UB’s offered share s, then D2 obtains s (Π+ δ∆)− δI and UB
obtains (1− s) (Π+ δ∆).
We assume that the ratio I/∆ and the share sˆ satisfy:
sH > xH sˆ >
I
∆
> sL > xL sˆ. (8)
This assumption asserts that investing is profitable for D2 if she obtains sH from UB,
or if she opts for the outside option and is optimistic, but is unprofitable otherwise; in
42That is, the joint distribution of θ and σ is given by Pr(G, g) = λxH , Pr(B, g) = λ(1− xH), Pr(G, b) =
(1− λ)xL and Pr(B, b) = (1− λ)(1− xL).
43This assumption rules out trivial situations in which UB would always offer sH and D2 would therefore
always invest.
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addition, it asserts that UB can win D2’s business with the lower share sL when she is
pessimistic, but needs instead to offer her the higher share sH if she is optimistic.
• Timing. There are three stages:
• Stage 0: Nature randomly draws the quality θ ∈ {G, B} of the outside option and
the signal σ ∈ {g, b}; the former is not observed, whereas the latter is privately
observed by D2.
• Stage 1: D2 chooses whether or not to invest; this decision is observed by UB.
• Stage 2: UB chooses whether to offer sL or sH; having observed the offer, D2 chooses
whether to accept it, or to opt for the outside option.
F.2 Equilibrium analysis
We now show that there exists a unique equilibrium, which we characterize:
Proposition 1 There exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which:
• D2 invests with probability 1 when she is optimistic, and with probability
y∗ ≡ λ (1− sH)
(1− λ) (sH − sL) ∈ (0, 1) (9)
otherwise.
• UB offers sL with probability 1 when D2 does not invest, and offers sH with probability
z∗ ≡ I − sL∆
(sH − sL) (∆+Π) ∈ (0, 1) (10)
otherwise.
The proof of this proposition consists of four lemmas. We first show that there is no
separating equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There is no separating equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that D2’s investment decision reveals her type, that is, whether she is
optimistic or pessimistic; upon observing D2’s investment decision, UB then updates and
shares D2’s beliefs. Two cases can be distinguished, depending on which type chooses to
invest.
• Case a. Suppose that D2 invests only when being optimistic. Along the equilibrium
path, UB then offers sH if D2 invests (as an optimistic D2 is unwilling to accept sL), and sL
if D2 does not invest (as a pessimistic D2 is willing to accept it). A pessimistic D2 would
therefore gain from deviating and investing, a contradiction.
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• Case b. Suppose now that D2 invests only when being pessimistic, in which case UB
offers sL. A pessimistic D2 would therefore gain from deviating and not investing, a con-
tradiction.
Next, we show that there is no pooling equilibrium either:
Lemma 2 There is no pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that D2 makes the same investment decision, regardless of her type.
In the continuation equilibrium, UB expects D2 to be optimistic with probability λ and
pessimistic with probability 1− λ. If UB offers sH, then D2 accepts the offer regardless
of her type, and UB thus obtains a share 1 − sH of the profit. If instead UB offers sL,
D2 accepts the offer when she is pessimistic and rejects it otherwise; UB thus obtains an
expected share of the profit equal to (1− λ) (1− sL), which exceeds 1− sH under (7). It
follows that UB offers sL with probability 1. But then, an optimistic D2 finds it optimal to
invest (and opt for the outside option), whereas a pessimistic D2 prefers not to invest, a
contradiction.
We now establish the existence of the candidate equilibrium:
Lemma 3 There exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which:
• D2 invests with probability 1 when she is optimistic, and with probability y∗ ∈ (0, 1)
otherwise.
• UB offers sL with probability 1 when D2 does not invest, and offers sH with probability
z∗ ∈ (0, 1) otherwise.
Proof. Suppose that D2 invests with probability 1 when she is optimistic, and with
probability y ∈ (0, 1) otherwise. If UB observes that D2 did not invest, he revises his
belief about D2 and expects her to be pessimistic; it is therefore optimal for UB to offer sL.
If UB observes instead that D2 invested, he expects D2 to be optimistic with probability
λˆ (y) =
λ
λ+ (1− λ) y .
If UB offers sH, then D2 accepts the offer regardless of her type, and UB thus obtains a
share 1− sH of the profit. If instead UB offers sL, then D2 accepts the offer when she is
pessimistic and rejects it otherwise, and UB thus obtains an expected share of the profit
equal to
[
1− λˆ (y)] (1− sL). Hence, for UB to be indifferent between making either offer,
the probability y must be equal to y∗, given by (9). It is straightforward to check that y∗ is
positive and increases with λ, and that (7) implies y∗ < 1.
Conversely, suppose that UB offers sL with probability 1 when D2 does not invest,
and sH with probability z ∈ (0, 1) otherwise. Consider first the investment decision of a
pessimistic D2. As D2 then always accepts UB’s offer, not investing yields a profit equal to
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sLΠ, whereas investing yields an expected profit given by [zsH + (1− z) sL] (Π+ ∆)− I.
Hence for a pessimistic D2 to be indifferent between investing or not, the probability z
must be satisfy:
sLΠ = [zsH + (1− z) sL] (Π+ ∆)− I,
which amounts to z = z∗, given by (10). It is straightforward to check that z∗ is positive
(from (8)) and strictly lower than 1.44
Finally, if D2 is indifferent between investing or not when she is pessimistic, then she
strictly prefers to invest when she is optimistic.
Finally, we check that there is no other equilibrium:
Lemma 4 The equilibrium characterized in lemma 3 is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which D2 invests with probability yH
when she is optimistic, and with probability yL otherwise. lemma 3 identified a unique
equilibrium among the candidates where yH = 1 and yL ∈ (0, 1); furthermore, the case
{yH = 1, yL = 0} is discarded by lemma 1 and the case where yH = yL = 1 is discarded
by lemma 2. Hence, without loss of generality, we can now focus on candidate equilibria
in which yH < 1, which in turn requires z < z∗ (otherwise, as seen above, an optimistic
D2 strictly prefers investing). It follows that yL = 0 and thus, from lemma 2, yH > 0.
But then, when observing that D2 invested, UB revises his beliefs and expects D2 to be
optimistic; it is therefore strictly optimal for UB to offer sH, contradicting the working
assumption z < z∗.
F.3 Conclusion
The above analysis shows that there exists a unique equilibrium, in which not only D2 and
UB depart from the initial theoretical predictions, but D2’s investment decision moreover
influences UB’s behavior: D2 invests with positive probability, in which case UB responds
by offering the higher share sH with positive probability. It can moreover be noted that
the introduction of uncertain social preferences for UA has no impact under vertical sepa-
ration, as UA never engages in sabotage anyway. Likewise, in the Commitment treatment,
introducing the possibility that social preferences may prevent UA from committing him-
self to offering the lowest share would have no impact, both in vertical separation and
vertical integration, as the associated uncertainty would be resolved before the stages
where the other players have to make their decisions.
44To see this, note that z∗ decreases as Π increases, and is therefore lower than
I − sL∆
(sH − sL) (∆+Π)
∣∣∣∣
Π=0
=
I
∆ − sL
sH − sL < 1,
where the inequality follows from (8).
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Online appendix for
Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up: an Experiment
Not for publication
A Instructions
A.1 Instructions for the Benchmark treatment
The following displays the english translation of the instructions handed out and read to
the subjects participating in the Benchmark treatment.
Instructions Benchmark (english translation)
You are about to participate to an experiment on decision-making. This experiment is
realized jointly by the Econometrics Laboratory at Ecole Polytechnique, Toulouse School
of Economics, and the INRA-ALISS Laboratory. During this session, you will be able to
earn money. How much you will earn will depend on your decisions and also on the
decisions taken by other participants with whom you will be interacting. In addition to
this amount you will also receive a participation fee of 5 Euros. Your earnings will be
paid cash at the end of the experiment, in a separate room for confidentiality reasons.
During the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to two separate rooms.
Because there are many of you, in total 30 participants, we had to allocate you into two
rooms. This allocation is purely random and has no relation to the decisions you have to
make during the experiment. During the experiment you will have to interact with other
participants in the same room as well as participants in the other room.
These instructions explain in detail what are the decision-making tasks you will have
to make during the experiment, and how your payment is going to be computed. All the
participants receive the same instructions, irrespective of the room they are allocated to.
The decisions you make during the experiment are anonymous.
If you have questions about the instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer
your questions privately. Along the session, it is prohibited to communicate with each
other, subject to being excluded from the session and not receiving any payment. We also
require that you do not use your mobile phones.
1
Proceedings of the experiment
At the beginning of this experiment, you will be attributed a role that you will keep
throughout the experiment. The computer program assigns these roles randomly. 10
participants will be assigned the role A, 10 the role B and 10 the role C. You will participate
to two phases of 10 periods each. You will keep the same role for all the periods of the
experiment. You will thus keep the same role for these two phases.
We present first the proceedings of the first phase. Once the first phase will be over, we
will give you the instructions for the second phase. The two phases are independent from
each other. At the end of the experiment, one period among the twenty periods will be
randomly drawn by the computer; this will determine your payments for the experiment.
Phase 1
This phase consists in ten periods. All your decisions are anonymous. We describe below
the proceedings of phase1.
Description of each period At the beginning of each period, groups of three players are
composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will interact through-
out the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues. All the groups are
anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 1, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 1. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
Inside each group of three participants, each period is composed of three stages:
• In stage 1, player C makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
– “ Invest" or
– “Not invest".
• In stage 2, the choice of player C in stage 1 is revealed to players A and B. Players A
and B make their decisions, simultaneously and without consulting each other. Each
of them must choose one among the following nine options, which correspond to a
percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
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- 85% or
- 90%.
• In stage 3, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes a second decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A" or
- “ Player B" .
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of all of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in euros.
Gains of player C The gains of player C depend on his investment decision and on
the percentage of the revenues that will be left to him subsequently. This percentage of
the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues offered by the player A or B
selected by player C in stage 3. The gains of player C in each situation are displayed in
the following table:
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
Example: suppose that
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C ;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
The gain of player C for this period is 20e.
Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B depend on the percentage of
the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and on the choices of player C (to invest
or not, and player A or B).
• If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 3:
- The gains of player A in each situation are displayed in the following table;
- The gain of player B is 2e.
• If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 3:
3
- The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table;
- The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A or B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 63 57 50 44 38 32 25 19 13
Invest 74 67 59 52 44 37 30 22 15
Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
The gain of player A for this period is 19e. The gain of player B for this period is 2e.
Information received by the players at the end of each period At the end of each pe-
riod, the screen displays the amount of the player’s gain for this period. Each player
learns only his gain for the current period; the gains of the other players are not dis-
played.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded of the choices of player C in stage 1 and in stage 3
and the choices of players A and B in stage 2.
Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 1 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
Thanks for your participation
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Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- At the beginning of each period, groups of three participants consisting of one
player A, one player B and one player C are constituted.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player B can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player C can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A phase consists of 10 periods.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At the end of the experiment, one period among the 20 periods played is randomly
drawn. Each participant will receive as a payment for the experiment the amount
of his gains for this period, plus the participation fee of 5e.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At each period, the three players of one group learn their own gains and the gains
of the two other players of their group.
TRUE  FALSE 
Example 1. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 50% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 90% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player B.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C chooses player A.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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Phase 2
The instructions for phase 2 are identical to the instructions for phase 1, except for the
computation of the gains of players A and B. For the record, these instructions detail the
proceedings of each period. As only the computation of the gains of players A and B
differs from that in phase 1, we will read this part only together. It corresponds to the text
written in blue.
You keep the same role than in phase 1 of the experiment. All your decisions are anony-
mous.
This phase is independent from phase 1. This phase consists in ten periods. We de-
scribe below the proceedings of phase 2.
Description of each period As in phase 1, at the beginning of each period, groups of
three players are composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will
interact throughout the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues.
All the groups are anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 2, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 2. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
As in phase 1, inside each group of three participants, each period consists in three
stages:
• In stage 1, player C makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
– “ Invest" or
– “Not invest".
• In stage 2, the choice of player C in stage 1 is revealed to players A and B. Players A
and B make their decisions, simultaneously and without consulting each other. Each
of them must choose one among the following nine options, which correspond to a
percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
- 85% or
- 90%.
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• In stage 3, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes a second decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A " or
- “ Player B" .
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of each of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in Euros.
Gains of player C
• The gain of player C is computed as in phase 1.
• The gain of player C depends on his investment decision and on the percentage of
the revenues that will be left to him subsequently.
• This percentage of the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues of-
fered by the player A or B selected by player C in stage 3.
The gain of player C in each situation is displayed in the following table (this table is the
same than in phase 1):
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B are computed differently in
phase 2 compared to phase 1. The gains of players A and B depend from the percentage
of the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and from the choices of player C (to
invest or not, and player A or B).
- If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 3:
– The gains of player A in each situation are displayed in the following table (this
table is not the same than in phase 1);
– The gain of player B is 2e.
• If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 3:
– The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table (this
table is not the same than in phase 1);
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– The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A and B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 15 13 12 10 9 7 6 4 3
Invest 37 33 30 26 22 19 15 11 7
In addition to the amount displayed above, player A also receives a guaranteed amount
that depends on the investment choice made by C. Whether player C selects A or B in
stage 3, player A is certain to receive this guaranteed amount. This guaranteed amount is
displayed in the following Table:
Additional payoff for A
Guaranteed amount
Choice of C
Not invest 52
Invest 29
Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
The gain of player A for this period is 4e+ 52e= 56e. The gain of player B for this period is
2e.
Information received by the players at the end of each period As in phase 1, at the end
of each period, the screen displays the amount of the player’s gain for this period. Each
player learns only his gain for the current period; the gains of the other players are not
displayed.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded of the choices of player C in stage 1 and in stage 3
and the choices of players A and B in stage 2.
Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 2 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
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Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- The table of the gains of player A, apart from the guaranteed amount, is the same
as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player B is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player C is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount is received by player A and player B.
TRUE  FALSE 
- Player A receives a guaranteed amount only if he is chosen by C in stage 3.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount received by player A depends on the investment choice by
player C in stage 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
Example 1. suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 50% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 90% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player B.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C chooses player A.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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A.2 Instructions for the Commitment treatment
The following displays the english translation of the instructions handed out and read to
the subjects participating in the Commitment treatment.
Instructions Commitment (english translation)
You are about to participate to an experiment on decision-making. This experiment is
realized jointly by the Econometrics Laboratory at Ecole Polytechnique, Toulouse School
of Economics, and the INRA-ALISS Laboratory. During this session, you will be able to
earn money. How much you will earn will depend on your decisions and also on the
decisions taken by other participants with whom you will be interacting. In addition to
this amount you will also receive a participation fee of 5 Euros. Your earnings will be
paid cash at the end of the experiment, in a separate room for confidentiality reasons.
During the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to two separate rooms.
Because there are many of you, in total 30 participants, we had to allocate you into two
rooms. This allocation is purely random and has no relation to the decisions you have to
make during the experiment. During the experiment you will have to interact with other
participants in the same room as well as participants in the other room.
These instructions explain in detail what are the decision-making tasks you will have
to make during the experiment, and how your payment is going to be computed. All the
participants receive the same instructions, irrespective of the room they are allocated to.
The decisions you make during the experiment are anonymous.
If you have questions about the instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer
your questions privately. Along the session, it is prohibited to communicate with each
other, subject to being excluded from the session and not receiving any payment. We also
require that you do not use your mobile phones.
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Proceedings of the experiment
At the beginning of this experiment, you will be attributed a role that you will keep
throughout the experiment. The computer program assigns these roles randomly. 10
participants will be assigned the role A, 10 the role B and 10 the role C. You will participate
to two phases of 10 periods each. You will keep the same role for all the periods of the
experiment. You will thus keep the same role for these two phases.
We present first the proceedings of the first phase. Once the first phase will be over, we
will give you the instructions for the second phase. The two phases are independent from
each other. At the end of the experiment, one period among the twenty periods will be
randomly drawn by the computer; this will determine your payments for the experiment.
Phase 1
This phase consists in ten periods. All your decisions are anonymous. We describe below
the proceedings of phase1.
Description of each period At the beginning of each period, groups of three players are
composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will interact through-
out the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues. All the groups are
anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 1, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 1. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
Inside each group of three participants, each period is composed of four stages:
• In stage 1, player A makes a decision. He chooses either to commit himself or to not
commit himself to leaving a 50% revenue share to player C. He must choose among
the following two options:
- “I commit myself to leaving a 50% revenue share" or
- “I do not commit myself".
If player A chooses to commit himself, he has no decision to make in stage 3. If he
chooses to not commit himself, he has a decision to make in stage 3.
• In stage 2, the choice of player A made in stage 1 is revealed to player C. Player C
makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
- “ Invest" or
- “Not invest".
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• In stage 3, the choices of player A in stage 1 and of player C in stage 2 are revealed
to players A and B. Player A makes his decision if he chose not to commit himself
in stage 1 (and has no decision to make otherwise). Player B makes his decision.
When player A and B make a decision, they make it simultaneously and without
consulting each other. Each of them must choose one among the following nine
options, which correspond to a percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave
to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
- 85% or
- 90%.
• In stage 4, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes his decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A " or
- “ Player B" .
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of all of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in euros.
Gains of player C The gains of player C depend on his investment decision and on
the percentage of the revenues that will be left to him subsequently. This percentage of
the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues offered by the player A or B
selected by player C in stage 4. The gains of player C in each situation are displayed in
the following table:
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
Example: suppose that
- In stage 1, player A chooses to not not commit himself to leaving 50% of revenues to player
C ;
- In stage 2, player C chooses to not invest;
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- In stage 3, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C ;
- In stage 4, player C selects player A.
The gain of player C for this period is 20e.
Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B depend on the percentage of
the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and on the choices of player C (to invest
or not, and player A or B).
• If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 4:
- The gains of player A in each situation are displayed in the following table;
- The gain of player B is 2e.
• If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 4:
- The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table;
- The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A or B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 63 57 50 44 38 32 25 19 13
Invest 74 67 59 52 44 37 30 22 15
Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A do not commit himself to leaving a 50% share of revenues to Player C ;
- In stage 2, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 3, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player A.
The gain of player A for this period is 19e. The gain of player B for this period is 2e.
Information received by the players at the end of each period At the end of each pe-
riod, the screen displays the amount of the player’s gain for this period. Each player
learns only his gain for the current period; the gains of the other players are not dis-
played.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded of the choices of player C in stage 2 and in stage 4,
the choice of player A in stage 1 and in stage 3 and the choice of player B in stage 3.
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Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 1 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
Thanks for your participation!
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Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- At the beginning of each period, groups of three participants consisting of one
player A, one player B and one player C are constituted.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player B can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player C can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A phase consists of 10 periods.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At the end of the experiment, one period among the 20 periods played is randomly
drawn. Each participant will receive as a payment for the experiment the amount
of his gains for this period, plus the participation fee of 5e.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At each period, the three players of one group learn their own gains and the gains
of the two other players of their group.
TRUE  FALSE 
- If player A chose to commit himself to leaving player C a 50% revenue share in stage
1, he may change this decision in stage 3.
TRUE  FALSE 
Example 1. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A chooses to commit himself to leaving a 50% share of revenues to player
C.
- In stage 2, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 3, player A has no decision to make because he committed himself in stage 1 to
leaving a 50% share of revenues to player C ; player B chooses to leave 90% of the revenues
to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player B.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A choose to not commit himself to leaving a 50% share of revenues to
player C.
- In stage 2, player C chooses to invest;
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- In stage 3, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player A.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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Phase 2
The instructions for phase 2 are identical to the instructions for phase 1, except for the
computation of the gains of players A and B. For the record, these instructions detail the
proceedings of each period. As only the computation of the gains of players A and B
differs from that in phase 1, we will read this part only together. It corresponds to the text
written in blue.
You keep the same role than in phase 1 of the experiment. All your decisions are anony-
mous.
This phase is independent from phase 1. This phase consists in ten periods. We de-
scribe below the proceedings of phase 2.
Description of each period As in phase 1, at the beginning of each period, groups of
three players are composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will
interact throughout the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues.
All the groups are anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 2, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 2. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
As in phase 1, inside each group of three participants, each period consists in four
stages:
• In stage 1, player A makes a decision. He chooses either to commit himself or to not
commit himself to leaving a 50% revenue share to player C. He must choose among
the following two options:
- “I commit myself to leaving a 50% revenue share" or
- “I do not commit myself".
If player A chooses to commit himself, he has no decision to make in stage 3. If he
chooses to not commit himself, he has a decision to make in stage 3.
• In stage 2, the choice of player A made in stage 1 is revealed to player C. Player C
makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
- “ Invest" or
- “Not invest".
• In stage 3, the choices of player A in stage 1 and of player C in stage 2 are revealed
to players A and B. Player A makes his decision if he chose not to commit himself
in stage 1 (and has no decision to make otherwise). Player B makes his decision.
When player A and B make a decision, they make it simultaneously and without
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consulting each other. Each of them must choose one among the following nine
options, which correspond to a percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave
to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
- 85% or
- 90%.
• In stage 4, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes his decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A " or
- “ Player B" .
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of each of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in Euros.
Gains of player C
• The gain of player C is computed as in phase 1.
• The gain of player C depends on his investment decision and on the percentage of
the revenues that will be left to him subsequently.
• This percentage of the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues of-
fered by the player A or B selected by player C in stage 4.
The gain of player C in each situation is displayed in the following table (this table is
the same than in phase 1):
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
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Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B are computed differently in
phase 2 compared to phase 1. The gains of players A and B depend from the percentage
of the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and from the choices of player C (to
invest or not, and player A or B).
- If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 4:
– The gains of player A in each situation are displayed in the following table (this
table is not the same than in phase 1);
– The gain of player B is 2e.
• If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 4:
– The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table (this
table is not the same than in phase 1);
– The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A and B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 15 13 12 10 9 7 6 4 3
Invest 37 33 30 26 22 19 15 11 7
In addition to the amount displayed above, player A also receives a guaranteed amount
that depends on the investment choice made by C. Whether player C selects A or B in
stage 4, player A is certain to receive this guaranteed amount. This guaranteed amount is
displayed in the following table:
Additional payoff for A
Guaranteed amount
Choice of C
Not invest 52
Invest 29
Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A chooses to not commit himself to leaving a 50% revenue share to player
C;
- In stage 2, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 3, player A chooses to let a 85% share of revenue to player C; player B chooses to
leave 55% share of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player A.
The gain of player A is 4e+ 52e= 56e. The gain of player B is 2e.
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Information received by the players at the end of each period As in phase 1, at the end
of each period, the screen displays the amount of the player’s gain for this period. Each
player learns only his gain for the current period; the gains of the other players are not
displayed.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded of the choices of player C in stage 2 and in stage 4,
the choice of player A in stage 1 and in stage 3 and the choice of player B in stage 3.
Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 2 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
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Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- The table of the gains of player A, apart from the guaranteed amount, is the same
as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player B is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player C is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount is received by player A and player B.
TRUE  FALSE 
- Player A receives a guaranteed amount only if he is chosen by C in stage 4.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount received by player A depends on the investment choice by
player C in stage 2.
TRUE  FALSE 
- If player A chose to commit himself to leaving player C a 50% revenue share in stage
1, he may change this decision in stage 3.
TRUE  FALSE 
Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A chooses to commit himself to leaving a 50% revenue share to player C;
- In stage 2, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 3, player A has no decision to make because he committed himself to let a 50% share
of revenue to player C; player B chooses to leave 90% share of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player B.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player A choose to not commit himself to leaving a 50% share of revenues to
player C.
- In stage 2, player C chooses to invest;
- In stage 3, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 4, player C selects player A.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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A.3 Instructions for the Sabotage treatment
The following displays the english translation of the instructions handed out and read to
the subjects participating in the Sabotage treatment.
Instructions Sabotage (english translation)
You are about to participate to an experiment on decision-making. This experiment is
realized jointly by the Econometrics Laboratory at Ecole Polytechnique, Toulouse School
of Economics, and the INRA-ALISS Laboratory. During this session, you will be able to
earn money. How much you will earn will depend on your decisions and also on the
decisions taken by other participants with whom you will be interacting. In addition to
this amount you will also receive a participation fee of 5 Euros. Your earnings will be
paid cash at the end of the experiment, in a separate room for confidentiality reasons.
During the experiment, you have been randomly assigned to two separate rooms.
Because there are many of you, in total 30 participants, we had to allocate you into two
rooms. This allocation is purely random and has no relation to the decisions you have to
make during the experiment. During the experiment you will have to interact with other
participants in the same room as well as participants in the other room.
These instructions explain in detail what are the decision-making tasks you will have
to make during the experiment, and how your payment is going to be computed. All the
participants receive the same instructions, irrespective of the room they are allocated to.
The decisions you make during the experiment are anonymous.
If you have questions about the instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer
your questions privately. Along the session, it is prohibited to communicate with each
other, subject to being excluded from the session and not receiving any payment. We also
require that you do not use your mobile phones.
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Proceedings of the experiment
At the beginning of this experiment, you will be attributed a role that you will keep
throughout the experiment. The computer program assigns these roles randomly. 10
participants will be assigned the role A, 10 the role B and 10 the role C. You will participate
to two phases of 10 periods each. You will keep the same role for all the periods of the
experiment. You will thus keep the same role for these two phases.
We present first the proceedings of the first phase. Once the first phase will be over, we
will give you the instructions for the second phase. The two phases are independent from
each other. At the end of the experiment, one period among the twenty periods will be
randomly drawn by the computer; this will determine your payments for the experiment.
Phase 1
This phase consists in ten periods. All your decisions are anonymous. We describe below
the proceedings of phase1.
Description of each period At the beginning of each period, groups of three players are
composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will interact through-
out the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues. All the groups are
anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 1, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 1. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
Inside each group of three participants, each period is composed of four stages:
• In stage 1, player C makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
– “ Invest" or
– “Not invest".
• In stage 2, the choice of player C in stage 1 is revealed to players A and B. Players A
and B make their decisions, simultaneously and without consulting each other. Each
of them must choose one among the following nine options, which correspond to a
percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
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- 85% or
- 90%.
• In stage 3, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes a second decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A " or
- “ Player B" .
• In stage 4, the choice made by player C in stage 3 is revealed to players A and B. If
player C has chosen player B in stage 3, no player makes any decision in stage 4. If
player C has chosen player A in stage 3, player A has to make a decision. He must
choose between two options:
- “Use the option S” or
- “Not use the option S”
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of all of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in euros.
Gains of player C The gains of player C depend on his investment decision and on
the percentage of the revenues that will be left to him subsequently. This percentage of
the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues offered by the player A or B
selected by player C in stage 3. If player C has chosen player A, his gains also depend
from the choice made by player A in stage 4 to adopt or not the option S .
• If player C chooses player B in stage 3, the gains of player C in each situation are
displayed in the following table:
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
• If player C chooses player A in stage 3 :
- The gains of player C in each situation are also displayed in the above table
whenever player A chooses not to use the option S ;
- The gains of player C are displayed in the following table whenever player A
chooses to use the option S .
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Gains of player C
If A chooses the option S
Choice of C
Not invest 11
Invest 3
Example: suppose that
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C ;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
- In stage 4, player A chooses not to use the option S .
The gain of player C for this period is 20e.
Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B depend on the percentage of
the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and on the choices of player C (to invest
or not, and player A or B).
• If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 3,
- The gains of player A depend on his choice to use or not the option S in stage
4 :
∗ If player A chooses not to use the option S , his gains in each situation are
displayed in the following table;
∗ If player A chooses to use the option S , it costs him 5e. His gains in each
situation are the ones displayed in the following table minus 5e.
- The gain of player B is 2e.
• If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 3:
- The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table;
- The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A or B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 63 57 50 44 38 32 25 19 13
Invest 74 67 59 52 44 37 30 22 15
Example. Suppose that:
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- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; Player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
- In stage 4, player A chooses not to use the option S .
The gain of player A for this period is 19e. The gain of player B for this period is 2e.
Information received by the players at the end of each period At the end of each pe-
riod, the screen displays the amount of the player’s gain for this period. Each player
learns only his gain for the current period; the gains of the other players are not dis-
played.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded the choices of player C in stage 1 and in stage 3, the
choices of players A and B in stage 2 and the choice of player A in stage 4 whenever
player A has been selected by player C in stage 3.
Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 1 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
Thanks for your participation!
26
Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- At the beginning of each period, groups of three participants consisting of one
player A, one player B and one player C are constituted.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player B can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A player A and a player C can be part of the same group several times during a
given phase.
TRUE  FALSE 
- A phase consists of 10 periods.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At the end of the experiment, one period among the 20 periods played is randomly
drawn. Each participant will receive as a payment for the experiment the amount
of his gains for this period, plus the participation fee of 5e.
TRUE  FALSE 
- At each period, the three players of one group learn their own gains and the gains
of the two other players of their group.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The gains of player A are reduced by 5e if he chooses to use the option S .
TRUE  FALSE 
Example 1. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 50% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 90% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player B.
- In stage 4, no player makes a decision because player C has chosen player B in stage 3.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C chooses player A.
- In stage 4, player A chooses to use the option S .
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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Phase 2
The instructions for phase 2 are identical to the instructions for phase 1, except for the
computation of the gains of players A and B. For the record, these instructions detail the
proceedings of each period. As only the computation of the gains of players A and B
differs from that in phase 1, we will read this part only together. It corresponds to the text
written in blue.
You keep the same role than in phase 1 of the experiment. All your decisions are anony-
mous.
This phase is independent from phase 1. This phase consists in ten periods. We de-
scribe below the proceedings of phase 2.
Description of each period As in phase 1, at the beginning of each period, groups of
three players are composed with one player A, one B and one C. These three players will
interact throughout the period. The interactions of these three players create revenues.
All the groups are anonymous: you will not know with whom you are playing.
During the ten periods of phase 2, players A and B interact only once: it is not possible
that players A and B interact once more in phase 2. Players C are randomly affected to a
player A and a player B: it is possible that a player C interacts several times with a player
A or a player B but it is not automatic.
As in phase 1, inside each group of three participants, each period consists in four
stages:
• In stage 1, player C makes a first decision. He must choose between two options:
– “ Invest" or
– “Not invest".
• In stage 2, the choice of player C in stage 1 is revealed to players A and B. Players A
and B make their decisions, simultaneously and without consulting each other. Each
of them must choose one among the following nine options, which correspond to a
percentage of the total revenues they plan to leave to player C:
- 50% or
- 55% or
- 60% or
- 65% or
- 70% or
- 75% or
- 80% or
- 85% or
- 90%.
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• In stage 3, the choices of players A and B in stage 2 are revealed to player C. Player
C makes a second decision. He must choose one of the two players A and B :
- “Player A " or
- “ Player B" .
• In stage 4, the choice made by player C in stage 3 is revealed to players A and B. If
player C has chosen player B in stage 3, no player makes any decision in stage 4. If
player C has chosen player A in stage 3, player A has to make a decision. He must
choose between two options:
- “ Use the option S” or
– “ Not use the option S”
How are the gains of each player computed in each period ?
The gains of players A, B and C at each period depend on the choices of each of them.
All the amounts reported in the following tables are in Euros.
Gains of player C
• The gain of player C is computed as in phase 1.
• The gain of player C depends on his investment decision and on the percentage of
the revenues that will be left to him subsequently.
• This percentage of the revenues corresponds to the percentage of the revenues of-
fered by the player A or B selected by player C in stage 3.
• If player C has chosen player A, his gains also depend from the choice made by
player A in stage 4 to adopt or not the option S .
If player C chooses player B in stage 3, the gain of player C in each situation is displayed
in the following table (this table is the same than in phase 1):
Gains of C
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
Invest 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
If player C chooses player A in stage 3 :
- The gains of player C in each situation are also displayed in the above table when-
ever player A chooses not to use the option S ;
- The gains of player C are displayed in the following table whenever player A chooses
to use the option S .
29
Gains of player C
If A chooses the option S
Choice of C
Not invest 11
Invest 3
Gains of players A and B The gains of players A and B are computed differently in
phase 2 compared to phase 1. The gains of players A and B depend from the percentage
of the revenues that they offer to leave to player C and from the choices of player C (to
invest or not, and player A or B).
- If player C chooses the offer of player A in stage 3:
– The gain of player A depend on his choice to use or not the option S in stage 4:
∗ If player A chooses not to use the option S , his gains in each situation are
displayed in the following table (this table is not the same as in phase 1) ;
∗ If player A chooses to use the option S , this brings him a gain of 5e. His
gains in each situation are those displayed in the following table plus 5e.
– The gain of player B is 2e.
- If player C chooses the offer of player B in stage 3:
– The gains of player B in each situation are displayed in the following table (this
table is not the same than in phase 1);
– The gain of player A is 2e.
Gains of A and B
Percentage of revenues left to C 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Choice of C
Not invest 15 13 12 10 9 7 6 4 3
Invest 37 33 30 26 22 19 15 11 7
In addition to the amount displayed above, player A also receives a guaranteed amount
that depends on the investment choice made by C. Whether player C selects A or B in
stage 3, player A is certain to receive this guaranteed amount. This guaranteed amount is
displayed in the following table:
Additional payoff for A
Guaranteed amount
Choice of C
Not invest 52
Invest 29
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Example. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 85% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 55% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player A.
- In stage 4, player A chooses not to use the option S .
The gain of player A for this period is 4e+ 52e= 56e. The gain of player B for this period is
2e.
Information received by the players at the end of each period As in phase 1, at the end
of each period, players learn on the screen the amount of their gain for this period. Each
player learns only his gain for the current period and the gain of the other players is not
displayed.
The screen also displays the decisions taken by all players during the period: the three
players in each group are reminded the choices of player C in stage 1 and in stage 3, the
choices of players A and B in stage 2 and the choice of player A in stage 4 whenever
player A has been selected by player C in stage 3.
Please read these instructions carefully. Before starting phase 2 of this experiment, you
will answer a few questions about these instructions. As soon as you will have correctly
answered these questions, we will be able to start.
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Questions about the instructions
Please answer the following questions about the instructions
- The table of the gains of player A, apart from the guaranteed amount, is the same
as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player B is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The table of the gains of player C is the same as in phase 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount is received by player A and player B.
TRUE  FALSE 
- Player A receives a guaranteed amount only if he is chosen by C in stage 3.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The guaranteed amount received by player A depends on the investment choice by
player C in stage 1.
TRUE  FALSE 
- The gains of player A are reduced by 5e if he chooses to use the option S .
TRUE  FALSE 
Example 1. suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to not invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 50% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 90% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C selects player B.
- In stage 4, no player makes any decision because player C has chosen player B in stage 3.
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
Example 2. Suppose that:
- In stage 1, player C chooses to invest;
- In stage 2, player A chooses to leave 70% of the revenues to player C; player B chooses to
leave 80% of the revenues to player C;
- In stage 3, player C chooses player A.
- In stage 4, player A chooses to use the option S .
What is the gain of player A ?
What is the gain of player B ?
What is the gain of player C ?
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B Level-k theory
For simplicity, we assume that, for any level k ≥ 1, every player believes that all the other
players are of level k− 1. We also assume that, when indifferent between several actions,
players randomly choose every of these actions with equal probability.
B.1 The Commitment game
B.1.1 Level-0
Players play randomly:
• In stage 0, UA commits himself to offering the lowest share with probability 1/2.
• In stage 1, D2 invests with probability 1/2.
• In stage 2, UA (if not committed) and UB each select any of the 9 possible sharing-
rules with probability 1/9.
• In stage 3, D2 selects each supplier with equal probability.
B.1.2 Level-1
From level-1 on, D2 selects in stage 3 the supplier offering the larger share. From now on,
we thus focus on the first three stages.
Stage 2. Suppliers anticipate a random selection by a level-0 D2, and thus seek to offer the
sharing rule that grants them the highest revenue; hence, UA (even if not committed) and
UB both offer 50%.
Stage 1. If UA has not committed himself in stage 0, D2 anticipates that both level-0 sup-
pliers will offer a randomly chosen sharing rule. The probabilities that the best offer is a
given sharing rule are presented in Table 28.
Table 28: Level-1, probability of receiving s as best offer
s 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Probability 181
3
81
5
81
7
81
9
81
11
81
13
81
15
81
17
81
Given these probabilities, D2 invests:
• not investing would yield an expected payoff equal to
10+ 3× 12+ 5× 13+ 7× 14+ 9× 16
+11× 17+ 13× 19+ 15× 20+ 17× 22
81
=
1461
81
;
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• by investing, she obtains instead
1+ 3× 5+ 5× 8+ 7× 12+ 9× 16
+11× 20+ 13× 23+ 15× 27+ 17× 31
81
=
1735
81
>
1461
81
.
If instead UA has committed himself in stage 0, then D2 anticipates that the best offer
will be that of level-0 UB, which can be any share with equal probability; her expected
profit is then the same, whether she invests or not:
• if she does not invest, her expected payoff is given by
10+ 12+ 13+ 14+ 16+ 17+ 19+ 20+ 22
9
=
143
9
;
• if she invests, her expected payoff is equal to
1+ 5+ 8+ 12+ 16+ 20+ 23+ 27+ 31
9
=
143
9
.
She thus invests randomly.
Stage 0. UA anticipates a random supplier selection by a level-0 D2 and thus wants to
offer 50% but is indifferent between doing so in stage 2 or in stage 0; UA thus commits
himself to offering the lowest share with probability 1/2.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• Stage 0. UA commits himself with probability 1/2.
• Stage 1. D2 invests with probability 1 if UA did not commit, and with probability
1/2 otherwise.
• Stage 2. Regardless of D2’s investment, UA (even if not already committed to doing
so) and UB (regardless of UA’s commitment decisions) both offer 50%.
B.1.3 Level-2
From level-2 on, suppliers expect D2 to select the larger share in stage 3.
Stage 2. Absent commitment, each supplier expects his level-1 rival to offer 50% no matter
what; hence, the relevant choice is between offering 50% or 55% (which suffices to be
selected for sure). Furthermore:
• Under VS, the gains from offering 55% are 67 in case of investment and 57 otherwise;
the expected gains from offering 50% are instead respectively equal to:
1
2
× 74+ 1
2
× 2 = 38 < 67 and 1
2
× 63+ 1
2
× 2 = 32.5 < 57.
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• Under VI (and ignoring the gain obtained through D1, which is fixed at this stage),
the expected gains from offering 55% are 33 in case of investment and 13 otherwise;
the expected gains from offering 50% are instead respectively equal to:
1
2
× 37+ 1
2
× 2 = 19.5 < 33 and 1
2
× 15+ 1
2
× 2 = 8.5 < 13;
It follows that offering 55% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. D2 never invests, as she anticipates that the level-1 suppliers will not offer more
than 50%.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-1 D2 to invest with probability 1/2 in case of commitment
and with probability 1 otherwise, and the level-1 UB to offer 50%, regardless of D2’s in-
vestment and of his own commitment decision.
Therefore, under VS:
• In the absence of commitment, UA expects D2 to invest and select his offered share
of 55%; the associated gain is equal to 67.
• Under commitment, UA expects D2 to invest with probability 1/2 and select his
offered share of 50% with probability 1/2; the associated expected gain is equal to:
1
2
×
(
1
2
× 74+ 1
2
× 2
)
+
1
2
×
(
1
2
× 63+ 1
2
× 2
)
= 35.25 < 67.
Likewise, under VI:
• In the absence of commitment, UA expects again D2 to invest and select his offered
share of 55%; the associated gain (including that of D1) is now equal to 33+ 29 = 62.
• Under commitment, UA expects again D2 to invest with probability 1/2 and select
his offered share of 50% with probability 1/2; the associated expected gain is now
equal to:
1
2
×
(
29+
1
2
× 37+ 1
2
× 2
)
+
1
2
×
(
52+
1
2
× 15+ 1
2
× 2
)
= 54.5 < 62.
It follows that UA never commits himself to offering 50%.
Recap. Under both VI and VS:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself.
• In stage 1, D2 never invests, regardless of UA’s commitment decision.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA (if not committed) and UB (regardless
of UA’s commitment decision) always offer 55%.
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B.1.4 Level-3
Stage 2. In case of commitment, the same reasoning as before (for level-2) implies that,
from level-3 on, UB always offers 55%, regardless of UA’s commitment and D2’s invest-
ment decisions.
Absent commitment, each supplier expects his level-2 rival to offer 55%; hence, offer-
ing more than 60% or less than 55% constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 60% are 59 in case of investment and 50
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 55% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 67+ 1
2
× 2 = 34.5 < 59 and 1
2
× 57+ 1
2
× 2 = 29.5 < 50.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 60% are 30 in case of investment and 12
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 55% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 33+ 1
2
× 2 = 17.5 < 30 and 1
2
× 13+ 1
2
× 2 = 7.5 < 12.
It follows that offering 60% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. D2 does not invest: regardless of the commitment decision, D2 anticipates that
level-2 suppliers will never offer more than 55%; hence, she does not invest.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-2 D2 to never invest and the level-2 UB to always offer 55%;
committing to offering 50% would therefore have no impact on the investment decision
but prevent UA from competing for D2 (and for D1 under VS); as losing the competition
for support yields the lowest possible upstream payoff (namely, 2), it follows that UA does
not commit himself.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself.
• In stage 1, D2 never invests, regardless of UA’s commitment decision.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB offer 60% in the absence of
commitment, otherwise UB offers 55%.
B.1.5 Level-4
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment, each sup-
plier expects his level-3 rival to offer 60%; offering more than 65% or less than 60% thus
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
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• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 65% are 52 in case of investment and 44
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 60% are instead respectively equal to:
1
2
× 59+ 1
2
× 2 = 30.5 < 52 and 1
2
× 50+ 1
2
× 2 = 26 < 44.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 65% are 26 in case of investment and 10
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 60% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 30+ 1
2
× 2 = 16 < 26 and 1
2
× 12+ 1
2
× 2 = 7 < 10.
It follows that offering 65% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. D2 never invests, regardless of the commitment decision, as she anticipates that
level-3 suppliers will not offer more than 60%.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-3 D2 to never invest and the level-3 UB to offer 55% in case of
commitment and 60% otherwise; committing himself would therefore have no impact on
the investment decision but prevent UA from competing for D2 (and for D1 under VS); it
follows that UA does not commit.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself.
• In stage 1, D2 never invests, regardless of UA’s commitment decision.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB offer 65% in the absence of
commitment, otherwise UB offers 55%;
B.1.6 Level-5
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment, each sup-
plier expects his level-4 rival to offer 65%; hence, offering more than 70% or less than 65%
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 70% are 44 in case of investment and 38
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 65% are instead respectively equal to:
1
2
× 52+ 1
2
× 2 = 27 < 44 and 1
2
× 44+ 1
2
× 2 = 23 < 38.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 70% are 22 in case of investment and 9
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 65% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 26+ 1
2
× 2 = 14 < 22 and 1
2
× 10+ 1
2
× 2 = 6 < 9.
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It follows that offering 70% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. D2 never invests, regardless of the commitment decision, as she anticipates that
level-4 suppliers will not offer more than 65%.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-4 D2 to never invest and the level-4 UB to offer 55% in case
of commitment and 65% otherwise; committing himself would therefore have no impact
on the investment decision but prevent UA from competing; it follows that UA does not
commit.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself.
• In stage 1, D2 never invests, regardless of UA’s commitment decision.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB offer 70% in the absence of
commitment, otherwise UB offers 55%;
B.1.7 Level-6
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment, each sup-
plier expects his level-5 rival to offer 70%; hence, offering more than 75% or less than 70%
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 75% are 37 in case of investment and 32
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 70% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 44+ 1
2
× 2 = 23 < 37 and 1
2
× 38+ 1
2
× 2 = 20 < 32.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 75% are 19 in case of investment and 7
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 70% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 22+ 1
2
× 2 = 12 < 19 and 1
2
× 9+ 1
2
× 2 = 5.5 < 7.
It follows that offering 75% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. Absent commitment, D2 anticipates that level-5 suppliers will offer 70%, and is
thus indifferent between investing or not; hence, she invests with probability 1/2. In case
of commitment, D2 anticipates that the level-5 UB will offer 55%, and thus does not invest.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-5 D2 to never invest and the level-5 UB to offer 55% in case
of commitment and 70% otherwise; committing would therefore have no impact on the
investment decision but prevent UA from competing; it follows that UA does not commit.
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Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself.
• In stage 1, D2 invests with probability 1/2 in the absence of commitment, otherwise
she does not invest.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB offer 75% in the absence of
commitment, otherwise UB offers 55%.
B.1.8 Level-7
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment, each sup-
plier expects his level-6 rival to offer 75%; hence, offering more than 80% or less than 75%
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 80% are 30 in case of investment and 25
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 75% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 37+ 1
2
× 2 = 19.5 < 30 and 1
2
× 32+ 1
2
× 2 = 17 < 25.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 80% are 15 in case of investment and 6
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 75% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 19+ 1
2
× 2 = 10.5 < 15 and 1
2
× 7+ 1
2
× 2 = 4.5 < 6.
It follows that offering 80% is the best response, under both VS and VI, and regardless
of the investment decision.
Stage 1. In the absence of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-6 suppliers will offer
75%, and thus invests. In case of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-6 UB will offer
55%, and thus does not invest.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-6 UB to offer 55% in case of commitment and 75% other-
wise. Hence, under VS, UA does not commit himself, as this would prevent him from
competing.
Under VI, if he commits, UA expects the level-6 D2 not to invest, and to select UB;
the expected gain is 52 + 2 = 54. In the absence commitment, UA expects the level-6 D2
to invest with probability 1/2 and accept his offered share of 80%; the expected gain is
therefore:
1
2
× (29+ 15) + 1
2
× (52+ 6) = 51 < 54.
It follows that UA commits himself under VI.
Recap.
39
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
• In stage 1, under both VS and VI, D2 invests in the absence of commitment, other-
wise she does not invest.
• In stage 2, under both VS and VI, and regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB
offer 80% in the absence of commitment, otherwise UB offers 55%.
B.1.9 Level-8
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment, each sup-
plier expects his level-7 rival to offer 80%; hence, offering more than 85% or less than 80%
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
• Under VS, the expected gains from offering 85% are 22 in case of investment and 19
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 80% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 30+ 1
2
× 2 = 16 < 22 and 1
2
× 25+ 1
2
× 2 = 13.5 < 19.
• Under VI, the expected gains from offering 85% are 11 in case of investment and 4
otherwise; the expected gains from offering 80% are instead, respectively:
1
2
× 15+ 1
2
× 2 = 8.5 < 11 and 1
2
× 6+ 1
2
× 2 = 4.
It follows that suppliers offer 85% under VS, regardless of the investment decision,
and under VI, in case of investment; under VI and in the absence of investment, sup-
pliers randomize with equal probability between offering 80% or 85%, and anticipate an
expected upstream payoff of 4.
Stage 1. In the absence of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-7 suppliers will offer
80%, and thus invests. In case of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-7 UB will offer
55%, and thus does not invest.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-7 UB to offer 55% in case of commitment and 80% other-
wise. Hence, under VS, UA does not commit himself, as this would prevent him from
competing.
Under VI, if he commits, UA expects the level-7 D2 not to invest, and select UB; the
expected gain is therefore 52 + 2 = 54. In the absence of commitment, UA expects the
level-7 D2 to invest and accept his offered share of either 80% or 85%, yielding an expected
payoff 29+ 4 = 33 < 54. It follows that UA commits himself.
Recap.
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
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• In stage 1, under both VS and VI, D2 invests in the absence of commitment, other-
wise she does not invest.
• In stage 2, UB offers 55% in case of commitment; in the absence of commitment,
suppliers offer 85% under VS (regardless of the investment decision) and under VI
in case of investment, and randomize between 80% and 85% with equal probability
under VI in the absence of investment.
B.1.10 Level-9
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment:
• Regardless of the investment decision under VS, and in case of investment under
VI, each supplier expects his level-8 rival to offer 85%; hence; offering less than 85%
constitutes a dominated strategy. Furthermore:
– Under VS, the expected gains from offering 90% are 15 in case of investment
and 13 otherwise; the expected gains from offering 85% are instead, respec-
tively:
1
2
× 22+ 1
2
× 2 = 12 < 15 and 1
2
× 19+ 1
2
× 2 = 10.5 < 13.
– Under VI, in case of investment, the expected gain from offering 90% is 7,
whereas the expected gain from offering 85% is:
1
2
× 11+ 1
2
× 2 = 6.5 < 7.
• Under VI and in the absence of investment, both suppliers expect the other, level-8
supplier to offer 80% and 85% with equal probability; hence, offering less than 80%
constitute dominated strategies. Furthermore:
– the expected gain from offering 90% is 3;
– the expected gain from offering 85% is
1
2
× 4+ 1
2
×
(
1
2
× 4+ 1
2
× 2
)
= 3.5 > 3;
– the expected gain from offering 80% is
1
2
×
(
1
2
× 6+ 1
2
× 2
)
+
1
2
× 2 = 3.
It follows that suppliers offer 90% under VS, regardless of the investment decision,
and under VI in case of investment; by contrast, under VI and in the absence of invest-
ment, they only offer 85%.
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Stage 1. In the absence of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-8 suppliers will offer 85%,
and thus invests. In case of commitment, D2 anticipates that the level-8 UB will offer 55%,
and thus does not invest.
Stage 0. UA expects the level-8 UB to offer 55% in case of commitment and at least 80%
otherwise. Hence, under VS, UA does not commit himself, as this would prevent him
from competing.
Under VI, in case of commitment UA expects the level-8 D2 not to invest, and select
UB; the expected gain is therefore 52 + 2 = 54. In the absence commitment, UA expects
the level-8 D2 to invest and accept his offered share of 90%, yielding an expected payoff
29+ 7 = 36 < 54. It follows that UA commits himself.
Recap.
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
• In stage 1, under both VS and VI, D2 invests in the absence of commitment, other-
wise she does not invest.
• In stage 2, UB offers 55% in case of commitment; in the absence of commitment,
suppliers offer 90% under VS (regardless of the investment decision) and under VI
in case of investment, and offer instead 85% under VI in the absence of investment.
B.1.11 Level-10
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment:
• Under VS, regardless of the investment decision, and under VI, in case of invest-
ment, each supplier expects his level-9 rival to offer 90%; hence, offering less than
90% constitutes a dominated strategy.
• Under VI, in the absence of commitment and of investment, both suppliers expect
the other, level-9 supplier to offer 85%; hence, offering less than 85% constitutes a
dominated strategy. Furthermore, the expected gain from offering 90% is 3, which
coincides with the expected gain from offering 85%, given by:
1
2
× 4+ 1
2
× 2 = 3.
It follows that suppliers offer 90% under VS, regardless of the investment decision,
and under VI in case of investment; by contrast, under VI and in the absence of invest-
ment, they randomize with equal probability between offering 85% or 90%.
Stage 1. In the absence of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-9 suppliers will offer
90%, and thus invests. In case of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-9 UB will offer
55%, and thus does not invest.
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Stage 0. From level-10 on:
• UA expects the level-9 UB to offer 55% in case of commitment and at least 85%
otherwise. Hence, under VS, UA does not commit himself, as this would prevent
him from competing.
• Under VI, in case of commitment UA expects the level-9 D2 not to invest, and to
select UB; the expected gain is 52 + 2 = 54. In the absence of commitment, UA
expects the level-9 D2 to invest and accept his offered share of 90% with probability
1/2 (as the level-9 UB is expected to offer 90% as well); the expected payoff is thus:
29+
1
2
× 7+ 1
2
× 2 = 33.5 < 54.
It follows that UA commits himself under VI and does not do so under VS.
Recap.
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
• In stage 1, under both VS and VI, D2 invests in the absence of commitment, other-
wise she does not invest.
• In stage 2, UB offers 55% in case of commitment; in the absence of commitment,
suppliers offer 90% under VS (regardless of the investment decision) and under
VI in case of investment, and randomize instead with equal probability between
offering 85% or 90% under VI in the absence of investment.
B.1.12 Level-11
As already noted, from level-10 on, in stage 0 UA does not commit himself under VS, but
does so under VI. From now on, we thus focus on stages 1 and 2.
Stage 2. UB offers 55% in case of commitment. In the absence of commitment:
• Under VS, regardless of the investment decision, and under VI, in case of invest-
ment, each supplier expects his level-10 rival to offer 90%; hence, as in the previous
round, they offer 90%.
• Under VI, in the absence of investment, both suppliers expect the other, level-10
supplier to randomize with equal probability between offering 85% or 90%; hence,
offering less than 85% constitutes a dominated strategy. Furthermore, the expected
gain from offering 90% is
1
2
× 3+ 1
2
×
(
1
2
× 3+ 1
2
× 2
)
= 2.75,
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whereas that from offering 85% is
1
2
×
(
1
2
× 4+ 1
2
× 2
)
+
1
2
× 2 = 2.5 < 2.75.
It follows that suppliers offer 90% under both VS and VI, regardless of the investment
decision.
Stage 1. In the absence of commitment, D2 anticipates that level-10 suppliers will offer at
least 85%, and thus invests. In case of commitment, D2 anticipates that the level-10 UB
will offer 55%, and thus does not invest.
Recap.
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
• In stage 1, under both VS and VI, D2 invests in the absence of commitment, other-
wise she does not invest.
• In stage 2, under both VS and VI, and regardless of the investment decision, UB
offers 55% in case of commitment and both suppliers offer 90% in the absence of
commitment.
B.1.13 Level-12 on
We have:
• In stage 0, UA does not commit himself under VS, but does so under VI.
• In stage 1:
– absent commitment, D2 anticipates that level-(k− 1) suppliers will offer 90%,
and thus invests;
– in case of commitment, D2 anticipates that the level-(k− 1) UB will offer 55%,
and thus does not invest.
• In stage 2:
– absent commitment, each supplier expects his level-(k− 1) rival to offer 90%,
and responds by offering 90% as well;
– in case of commitment, as before UB offers 55%.
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B.1.14 Summary
From level-1 on, D2 selects in stage 3 the supplier offering the larger share. However,
at level-1 the suppliers, anticipating a random selection from D2, offer the lowest share,
50%. From level-2 on:
• D2 does not invest in case of commitment, as she expects UB to offer no more than
55% (specifically, 50% when of level 1 and 55% otherwise).
• An independent UA never commits himself, as this would yield for sure the lowest
possible payoff (2), whereas he can obtain a higher payoff with positive probability
by (not committing and) either matching or outbidding UB.
Furthermore, in the absence of commitment by UA:
• The suppliers offer a share that gradually increases: it reaches the investment indif-
ference threshold (70%) on level 5, (75%) on level 6, and the maximal level (90%)
on level 9 under VS and/or in case of investment, and on level-11 under VI in case
of no investment;
• In response, D2 does not invest on levels 1 to 5 (expecting to obtain less than 70%
from level-(k − 1) suppliers), randomizes between investing or not on level 6 (as
she expects to obtain 70% from level-5 suppliers), and invests from level 7 on (as
she expects to obtain more than 70% from level-(k− 1) suppliers).
It follows that an integrated UA:
• Does not commit himself on levels 1 to 6, as he expects to face a D2 player who, being
of level at most 5, will never invest anyway (and so committing himself brings no
benefit for the subsidiary D1, and prevents UA from competing with UB for D2);
• Commits himself from level 7 on, as D2 (being of type at least 6) would otherwise
invests with probability at least 1/2, and UB (being also of type at least 6) will make
a rather generous offer; hence, the benefit for the integrated subsidiary (equal to
(52− 29) /2 = 11.5 when D2 is of level-6, and 52− 29 = 23 when D2 is of a higher
level), which exceeds the expected difference in the bidding payoff (equal to (1/2)×
(15− 2) + (1/2)× (6− 2) = 8.5 when D2 is of level-6, and to no more than 11− 2 =
9 when D2 is of a higher level).
It follows that, along the equilibrium path, from level-2 on:
• Under VS:
– UA never commits itself to offering a low share;
– the suppliers offer a share that gradually increases: it reaches 70% on level 5,
75% on level 6 and 90% on level 9;
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– D2 does not invest before level 6, where she invests with probability 1/2, and
always invests from level 7 on.
• Under VI:
– before level-7, UA never commits himself and the two suppliers offer a share
that gradually increases, reaching 70% on level-5 and 75% on level-6; D2 never
invests before level-6, where it does so with probability 1/2.
– from level-7 on, UA commits himself to offering a low share, D2 never invests,
and UB offers 55%.
B.2 The Sabotage game
B.2.1 Level-0
Players play randomly:
• In stage 1, D2 invests with probability 1/2.
• In stage 2, UA and UB each select any of the 9 possible sharing-rules with probability
1/9.
• In stage 3, D2 selects each supplier with equal probability.
• In stage 4, UA degrades his support with probability 1/2 whenever he is selected by
D2.
B.2.2 Level-1
From level-1 on, in stage 4, an integrated UA always degrades his support when selected
by D2, whereas an independent UA never does so. From now on, we will focus on stages
1 to 3.
Stage 3. Under VS D2 selects the supplier offering the larger share; under VI, she selects
the supplier offering the best deal, assuming that UA’s support will be degraded with
probability 1/2.
Stage 2. Suppliers anticipate a random selection by a level-0 D2, and thus seek to offer the
sharing rule that grants them the highest revenue; hence, both suppliers offer 50%.
Stage 1. D2 anticipates that that the level-0 UA, if selected, will degrade his support with
probability 1/2. Hence, if she invests, her resulting expected payoffs, as a function of the
suppliers’ offers, are as in Table 29:
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Table 29: Level-1, Expected payoff for D2 (investment)
UA’s offer 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
D2’s expected payoff 2 4 5.5 7.5 9.5 11.5 13 15 17
UB’s offer 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
D2’s payoff 1 5 8 12 16 20 23 27 31
As D2 expects that both suppliers will randomize their offers, her expected payoff is:
1
9
×

20+ 23+ 27+ 31
+
8× 16+ 17
9
+
6× 12+ 13+ 15+ 17
9
+
4× 8+ 9.5+ 11.5+ 13+ 15+ 17
9
+
2× 5+ 5.5+ 7.5+ 9.5+ 11.5+ 13+ 15+ 17
9
+
2+ 4+ 5.5+ 7.5+ 9.5+ 11.5+ 13+ 15+ 17
9

=
1443
81
.
If instead D2 does not invest, her expected payoffs are given by Table 30:
Table 30: Level-1, Expected payoff for D2 (no investment)
UA’s offer 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
D2’s expected payoff 10.5 11.5 12 12.5 13.5 14 15 15.5 16.5
UB’s offer 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
D2’s payoff 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 22
As D2 expects that both suppliers will randomize their offers, her expected payoff is:
1
9
×

17+ 19+ 20+ 22
+
8× 16+ 16.5
9
+
6× 14+ 15+ 15.5+ 16.5
9
+
4× 13+ 13.5+ 14+ 15+ 15.5+ 16.5
9
+
3× 12+ 12.5+ 13.5+ 14+ 15+ 15.5+ 16.5
9
+
10.5+ 11.5+ 12+ 12.5+ 13.5+ 14+ 15+ 15.5+ 16.5
9

=
1348
81
<
1443
81
.
It follows that D2 invests.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 1, D2 invests.
• In stage 2, regardless of D2’s investment, UA and UB offer 50%.
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• In stage 3, D2 selects the supplier offering the best deal, assuming that UA’s support
will be degraded with probability 1/2.
B.2.3 Level-2
From level-2 on, all players anticipate that in stage 4, an integrated UA always degrades
his support when selected by D2, whereas an independent UA never does so.
Stage 3. It follows from the above observation that, from level-2 on:
• under VS, D2 selects the supplier offering the higher share and randomizes when
they offer the same share.
• under VI, D2 selects UA whenever UB offers a 50% share and selects UB otherwise.
From now on, we will focus on stages 1 and 2.
Stage 2. Each supplier expects his level-1 rival to offer a 50% share, and D2 to anticipate
that UA will use the sabotage option with probability 1/2. Hence, UA offers a 50% share
(as this suffices to win the competition for sure), whereas UB offers a 55% share (as this
suffices to win, and offering 50% would induce the level-2 D2 to select UA).
Stage 1. D2 anticipates that the two level-1 suppliers will offer a 50% share (and that the
level-1 UA will choose the sabotage option when integrated). As a result, D2 does not
invest.
Recap. Under both VS and VI:
• In stage 1, D2 does not invest.
• In stage 2, regardless D2’s investment, UA offers a 50% share and UB offers a 55%
share.
B.2.4 Level-3 on
Under VI, from level-3 on:
• In stage 2, both suppliers expect the level-2 D2 to select UA whenever UB offers a
50% share and UB otherwise; hence UB offers a 55% share and UA offers any share.
• In stage 1, anticipating that UB will offer a 55% share and that UA will offer a de-
graded support, D2 does not invest.
We now turn to the case of vertical separation.
Stage 2. Under VS, from level-3 on both suppliers expect the level-(k− 1) D2 to select the
higher offer; it follows from the analysis of the Commitment treatment that each supplier
seeks to outbid his level-(k− 1) rival. Hence, regardless of D2’s investment decision, we
have:
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• level-3: UA offers a 60% share and UB offers a 55% share;
• level-4: UA offers a 60% share and UB offers a 65% share;
• level-5: UA offers a 70% share and UB offers a 65% share;
• level-6: UA offers a 70% share and UB offers a 75% share;
• level-7: UA offers a 80% share and UB offers a 75% share;
• level-8: UA offers a 80% share and UB offers a 85% share;
• level-9: UA offers a 90% share and UB offers a 85% share;
• level-10 on: both suppliers offer a 90% share.
Stage 1. Based on the above observations:
• on levels 3 to 5, D2 expects the level-(k− 1) suppliers to offer at most a 65% share;
hence, she does not invest;
• on level-6, D2 expects the level-5 UA to offer a 70% share for a non-degraded sup-
port, and the level-5 UA to offer 65%; she thus invests with probability 1/2;
• from level-7 on, D2 expects the level-(k− 1) suppliers to offer at least 75% share,
and she thus invests.
B.2.5 Summary
From level-1 on, in stage 4, an integrated UA always degrades his support when selected
by D2, whereas an independent UA never does so. As a result, from level-2 on:
• Under VI, D2 does not invest and UB offers a low share of 55%, which D2 accepts.
• Under VS, D2 selects the supplier offering the higher share and, from level-3 on:
– suppliers gradually increase their offered shares: the better offer reaches 70%
on level 5, 75% on level 6 and 90% on level 9; both suppliers offer 90% from
level 10 on;
– D2 does not invest before level 6, where she invests with probability 1/2, and
always invests from level 7 on.
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C Robustness checks
We provide here robustness checks for the regressions presented in the paper.
Model I and Model II are the models used in the paper, with the second one controlling
for risk aversion and IQ score of the decision maker (“DM” in the tables). Model III
controls instead for risk aversion and IQ score of the three players in the group (“All” in
the tables).
Models IV, V and VI are similar to Models I, II and III, but exclude the first two periods
in each phase. For each interest variable, two tables are available: the first table presents
coefficients with clusters at the individual level and controls for session dummies (Models
I, II, III, IV, V and VI) and the second table uses clusters at the session level (Models I’, II’,
III’, IV’, V’ and VI’).
For each table, standard errors are reported in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
C.1 Impact of Vertical integration on subjects’ behavior
C.1.1 D2 subjects
Investment decisions
Table 31: Marginal effect of VI on investment (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual
level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Commitment -0.428∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Sabotage -0.367∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.049)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 32: Marginal effect of VI on investment (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025)
Commitment -0.428∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
Sabotage -0.370∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.089) (0.087) (0.099) (0.089) (0.088)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Revenue sharing
Table 33: Marginal effect of VI on the share accepted by D2 (OLS model) - Cluster at the
individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark 0.600 0.600 0.600 -0.229 -0.229 -0.229
(0.553) (0.554) (0.515) (0.544) (0.545) (0.514)
Commitment -20.117∗∗∗ -20.117∗∗∗ -20.117∗∗∗ -21.417∗∗∗ -21.417∗∗∗ -21.417∗∗∗
(1.282) (1.284) (1.294) (1.451) (1.454) (1.461)
Sabotage -10.450∗∗∗ -10.450∗∗∗ -10.450∗∗∗ -12.313∗∗∗ -12.313∗∗∗ -12.313∗∗∗
(1.181) (1.183) (1.189) (1.189) (1.191) (1.203)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 34: Marginal effect of VI the share accepted by D2 (OLS model) - Cluster at the
session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark 0.600 0.600 0.600 -0.229 -0.229 -0.229
(0.681) (0.682) (0.685) (0.708) (0.710) (0.713)
Commitment -20.117∗∗ -20.117∗∗ -20.117∗∗ -21.417∗∗ -21.417∗∗ -21.417∗∗
(3.547) (3.553) (3.565) (4.138) (4.147) (4.164)
Sabotage -10.450∗∗ -10.450∗∗ -10.450∗∗ -12.313∗∗ -12.313∗∗ -12.313∗∗
(1.596) (1.599) (1.604) (2.126) (2.130) (2.139)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.1.2 Suppliers
UA subjects
Table 35: Marginal effect of VI on offered shares by UA (OLS model) - Cluster at the
individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.250 0.250 0.250
(0.993) (0.995) (1.010) (0.995) (0.998) (1.004)
Commitment -22.583∗∗∗ -22.583∗∗∗ -22.583∗∗∗ -24.042∗∗∗ -24.042∗∗∗ -24.042∗∗∗
(2.688) (2.692) (2.682) (2.769) (2.775) (2.786)
Sabotage 0.217 0.217 0.217 -1.083 -1.083 -1.083
(1.100) (1.102) (1.079) (1.047) (1.050) (1.043)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 36: Marginal effect of VI on offered shares by UA (OLS model) - Cluster at the
session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.250 0.250 0.250
(1.527) (1.529) (1.534) (1.666) (1.670) (1.677)
Commitment -22.583∗∗ -22.583∗∗ -22.583∗∗ -24.042∗∗ -24.042∗∗ -24.042∗∗
(2.449) (2.453) (2.461) (2.975) (2.981) (2.994)
Sabotage 0.217 0.217 0.217 -1.083 -1.083 -1.083
(1.620) (1.623) (1.629) (1.233) (1.235) (1.240)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
UB subjects
Table 37: Marginal effect of VI on offered shares by UB (OLS model) - Cluster at the
individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark -1.183 -1.183 -1.183 -1.479 -1.479 -1.479
(1.054) (1.056) (1.052) (1.102) (1.105) (1.098)
Commitment -18.100∗∗∗ -18.100∗∗∗ -18.100∗∗∗ -19.229∗∗∗ -19.229∗∗∗ -19.229∗∗∗
(1.416) (1.418) (1.427) (1.666) (1.670) (1.674)
Sabotage -13.633∗∗∗ -13.633∗∗∗ -13.633∗∗∗ -14.979∗∗∗ -14.979∗∗∗ -14.979∗∗∗
(1.823) (1.826) (1.832) (1.989) (1.993) (2.004)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 38: Marginal effect of VI on offered shares byUB (OLS model) - Cluster at the session
level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark -1.183 -1.183 -1.183 -1.479 -1.479 -1.479
(1.655) (1.658) (1.663) (2.121) (2.125) (2.134)
Commitment -18.100∗∗ -18.100∗∗ -18.100∗∗ -19.229∗∗ -19.229∗∗ -19.229∗∗
(2.957) (2.962) (2.972) (3.667) (3.674) (3.690)
Sabotage -13.633∗∗ -13.633∗∗ -13.633∗∗ -14.979∗∗ -14.979∗∗ -14.979∗∗
(2.357) (2.361) (2.369) (2.355) (2.360) (2.370)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.2 Effect of UA’s commitment
Table 39: Marginal effect of UA’s commitment (Probit and OLS models) - Cluster at the
individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Investment -0.500∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.020) (0.022)
Share offered by UB -22.851∗∗∗ -22.874∗∗∗ -23.057∗∗∗ -24.200∗∗∗ -24.240∗∗∗ -24.442∗∗∗
(1.666) (1.657) (1.647) (1.876) (1.860) (1.856)
Share accepted by D2 -28.283∗∗∗ -28.296∗∗∗ -28.301∗∗∗ -29.081∗∗∗ -29.100∗∗∗ -29.137∗∗∗
(0.951) (0.945) (0.991) (1.074) (1.065) (1.086)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 40: Marginal effect of UA’s commitment (Probit and OLS models) - Cluster at the
session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Investment -0.481∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.035) (0.026) (0.024)
Share offered by UB -22.947∗∗ -22.890∗∗ -23.058∗∗ -24.271∗∗ -24.196∗∗ -24.389∗∗
(2.676) (2.720) (2.688) (3.268) (3.289) (3.297)
Share accepted by D2 -28.502∗∗∗ -28.537∗∗∗ -28.515∗∗∗ -29.340∗∗∗ -29.347∗∗∗ -29.339∗∗∗
(2.250) (2.232) (2.372) (2.536) (2.543) (2.691)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.3 Impact of vertical integration on departures from theory
C.3.1 Hold-up decisions (σHA )
Table 41: Marginal effect of VI on σHA (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Commitment 0.198∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Sabotage 0.115 0.108 0.095 0.105 0.103 0.088
(0.078) (0.071) (0.067) (0.071) (0.068) (0.062)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 42: Marginal effect of VI on σHA (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Commitment 0.203∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.101) (0.096) (0.088) (0.096) (0.090) (0.080)
Sabotage 0.110∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.048) (0.044) (0.054) (0.051) (0.026)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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C.3.2 Shared offered by UA (σOA )
Table 43: Marginal effect of VI on σOA (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 0.028 0.032 0.033
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Commitment 0.096 0.082 0.086 0.150∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(for non-committed UA) (0.078) (0.063) (0.063) (0.054) (0.068) (0.054)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 44: Marginal effect of VI on σOA (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 0.025 0.027 0.029
(0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.095) (0.094) (0.092)
Commitment 0.112∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(for non-committed UA) (0.020) (0.038) (0.033) (0.010) (0.029) (0.015)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.3.3 Shares offered by UB (σOB )
Table 45: Marginal effect of VI on σOB (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.022 0.024 0.024
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.048) (0.055)
Commitment 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.036 0.040 0.040
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046)
Sabotage 0.301∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 46: Marginal effect of VI on σOB (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.021 0.023 0.023
(0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.094) (0.091) (0.092)
Commitment 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.042 0.042 0.043
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055)
Sabotage 0.303∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.3.4 Investment decisions (σID)
Table 47: Marginal effect of VI on σID (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark -0.080∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Commitment 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.037 0.039 0.040
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Sabotage 0.389∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 48: Marginal effect of VI on σID (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark -0.080∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025)
Commitment 0.030 0.032 0.036 0.038 0.044 0.046
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078) (0.069) (0.072) (0.071)
Sabotage 0.393∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.077) (0.074) (0.082) (0.079) (0.073)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
C.3.5 Choice of supplier (σUD )
Table 49: Marginal effect of VI on σUD (Probit model) - Cluster at the individual level
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Benchmark -0.024∗ -0.025∗ -0.024∗ -0.017 -0.018 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Commitment 0.043∗ 0.044∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Sabotage 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 50: Marginal effect of VI on σUD (Probit model) - Cluster at the session level
Model I’ Model II’ Model III’ Model IV’ Model V’ Model VI’
Benchmark -0.024∗ -0.025 -0.025 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
Commitment 0.042 0.045 0.044 0.057 0.060 0.058
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042)
Sabotage 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.032) (0.038) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
IQ and risk-aversion No DM All No DM All
Exclusion of P1 and P2 No No No Yes Yes Yes
D Interplay between individual departures
Table 51: Interplay between individual departures in t and t+ 1 under VI (Probit model)
Commitment Sabotage
σOB in t on σ
I
D in t+ 1 (if σ
H
A = 0) 0.055
(0.054)
σOB in t on σ
I
D in t+ 1 0.217
∗∗∗
(0.051)
σID in t on σ
H
A in t+ 1 0.026
(0.068)
σHA in t on σ
I
D in t+ 1 (if UA selected in t) -0.125
(0.142)
σOB in t on σ
H
A in t+ 1 0.244
∗∗∗
(0.074)
σHA in t on σ
O
B in t+ 1 (if UA selected in t) -0.081
(0.113)
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